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 OVERVIEW 
The current issue focuses on the EU and primarily the EMU anchors for promoting stability and 
growth in the candidate and potential candidate countries. It is widely acknowledged that the EU 
accession prospect and the gradual insertion in the Economic and Monetary Union policy framework 
represent valuable instruments for the sustainable development of the aspiring members. For that 
purpose, the two papers published in this report – "The Euro as external anchor in the Western 
Balkans" and "Fiscal consolidation in candidate and potential candidate countries" – represent an 
attempt of assessing the economic and policy benefits, as well as some of the main potential 
challenges posed by the euro external anchor and the EMU framework for the candidate and potential 
candidate countries.  
The first paper takes stock of the extensive use of the euro in the Western Balkans, in all its traditional 
functions emphasized by the literature (trade invoicing currency, reserve currency, exchange rate and 
monetary anchor, financial currency and parallel cash). Naturally, the highest attention is granted to 
the de facto euroisation of the economies in the region and the widespread pegging of domestic 
currencies to the euro.  
The paper describes the historical context in which the break-up of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia contributed to the use of the DM and later the euro as external anchors for 
policy making and/or parallel currencies. It shows that together with other stabilisation policies and 
structural reforms, which were partly inspired by the EU accession process or the EMU policy 
framework, the euro anchor has supported a rapid and sustainable disinflation process, an 
improvement of fiscal policies and a deepening of trade and financial integration with the EU. Finally, 
in the recent period, economic growth became more robust and sustainable. Before concluding, the 
paper reviews the challenges posed by the use of external anchors and parallel currencies in the 
region. In the context of rapid real convergence and institutional transformation, euro-pegging and 
increasing borrowing in foreign currency may add to macroeconomic risks in case of inadequate 
domestic policies. The note argues in favour of accelerating structural reforms that would enhance the 
flexibility of goods and labour markets and conducting sound fiscal policies so that the candidate and 
potential candidate countries can take full advantage of the EU and euro anchors. 
The second paper covers the Western Balkans and Turkey which are all either candidate (Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) or potential candidate (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) countries. The European Union has since 2001 established an 
economic and fiscal surveillance procedure with candidate countries. More recently, in 2006, the 
Commission extended some of the main features of this economic and fiscal surveillance to potential 
candidate countries. These two procedures are briefly presented in the paper, as well as the other 
channels of influence established between the EU and those countries that are expected to accede in 
the medium or long-term horizon. The European agenda and priorities are also made clear to the 
candidate and potential candidates in, respectively, Accession and European "Partnerships" that 
establish the key steps that need to be taken in order to join the EU.  
The paper shows that fiscal consolidation has overall taken place in the region with remarkable 
improvements in fiscal positions, in particular in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Over the period, fiscal balances improved 
markedly, but this improvement was achieved with different patterns, a combination of reduced 
expenditure and increased revenue in candidate countries, whereas in potential candidate countries 
buoyant revenues were the main source of improved balances. Additional fiscal space for private 
sector development was thus created owing to reduced public deficits but only in a more limited 
number of cases due to a reduced share of general government spending.  In the absence of estimates 
of output gaps and structural balances it remains however difficult to fully assess the extent to which 
these improvements were purely cyclical – a feature which may have more limited relevance for 





number of countries, in particular Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, have relaxed fiscal 
discipline, thus jeopardizing some of their achievements of the recent period. 
Overall, while it would be hazardous to draw a direct link between surveillance and EU objectives on 
one side and, on the other side, fiscal consolidation achievements, the combined -even distant- EU 
accession prospect and narrow margins of manœuvre as regards the macro-economic policy mix 
appears to have had a strong incentive role in convincing candidate and potential candidate countries' 
fiscal authorities to pursue overall prudent fiscal policies. IMF programmes also contributed to fiscal 
discipline, but in the recent period most of them have come to an end. The recent worsening of the 
international environment and of these countries' external imbalances is expected to put an additional 
onus on fiscal policies to deliver some of the adjustments that can hardly be attained through the 
monetary policy channel. 
These papers were prepared by staff within the Unit “Economic affairs of candidate countries and 
Western Balkans. Economic policy related to enlargement” in the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs - Directorate for International Economic and 
Financial Affairs. The first paper was drafted by Mihai Macovei and co-authored by 
Christophe Pavret de la Rochefordière (subchapters 2 and 4.2), Frank Kohlenberger (subchapters 3.1, 
3.2, 3.4 and 3.5), Dirk Verbeken (subchapters 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) and Bernhard  Böhm 
(subchapter 5.1). The second paper was drafted by Christophe  Pavret de la Rochefordière with 
contributions from Frank Kohlenberger and Ana Sabič from the Croatian National Bank at the time of 
her secondment to the European Commission.  
The authors are grateful for the valuable comments and suggestions received from Marco Buti, Istvan 
Szekely, Peter Grasmann, Max Watson and Johan Baras.  
The views expressed are the authors' alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European 
Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: 
 
Corresponding editor: José Leandro 
European Commission 
BU-24 02/23 
B - 1049 Brussels 
E-mail: jose.leandro@ec.europa.eu 
 
 Part I 
The Euro as external anchor in the Western 
Balkans 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
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After its creation in 1999, the euro quickly 
established itself as the second main international 
currency.  In the Western Balkans, which have a 
clear European perspective and whose 
economies are well integrated with the EU, the 
euro is not only the first international currency, 
but also represents an important instrument for 
economic stabilisation and growth.  These 
economies are highly euroised and in five of 
them (out of seven) the current exchange rate 
arrangements are based on the euro as an 
external anchor.  The paper presents historical 
trends in the use of the euro in the region, the 
macro-stabilisation role indirectly or directly 
played by the euro in the Western Balkans
1 and 
the challenges faced by these economies in the 
future.  In the context of the ongoing rapid real 
convergence against the background of 
insufficiently strengthened institutions and a 
relatively low flexibility of markets or mobility 
of factors of production, external 
competitiveness and financial stability could 
come under pressure. 
The second section provides a description of the 
historical context in which the break-up of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
took place and of the factors that led to the 
widespread use of the DM and later the euro as 
external anchors for policy making and/or as 
parallel currencies. It concludes that the use of 
the DM/euro as a stabilising anchor was not so 
much the outcome of an initial policy choice, but 
more so of the preference of domestic economic 
agents which triggered this policy response from 
their authorities.  
The role played by the euro as international 
currency in the Western Balkan countries is 
examined in the third section which looks at the 
traditional functions emphasized by the literature 
on international currencies (trade invoicing 
currency, reserve currency, exchange rate and 
monetary anchor, financial currency and parallel 
cash).  With many of these countries exhibiting a 
high degree of de facto euroisation, special 
emphasis will be put on the euro's wide use as 
 
1    The following economies are covered:  the candidate 
countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the potential candidate countries Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and 
Kosovo (UNSCR 1244). 
domestic financial currency (currency of 
denomination of domestic bank loans and 
deposits) and as parallel currency.  
The fourth section assesses improvements in 
terms of economic stability and performance 
brought about by the official and de facto pegs 
against the DM and later the euro in the Western 
Balkans, together with stabilisation policies and 
structural reforms that are partially inspired by 
the EMU policy framework.  The widespread use 
of the DM/euro in the region played an important 
role in stabilising and avoiding a complete 
collapse of the economies during the initial 
stages of the Yugoslav crisis, while later it 
facilitated the trade and financial integration with 
the EU. These improvements include the rapid 
and sustainable disinflation process, the 
amelioration of the fiscal stance as the onus of 
the policy-mix fell on the conduct of a sound 
fiscal policy in the absence of monetary policy 
instruments, the reduction of exchange rate 
uncertainty and transaction costs contributing to 
rapidly growing trade with the EU, the rapid 
financial deepening and ultimately the more 
robust and sustainable growth. 
Before concluding, the paper reviews the 
challenges posed by the use of external anchors 
in the region. The fifth section takes stock of the 
large external imbalances and rapid financial 
deepening prevailing in the Western Balkans and 
tries to assess whether the current policies are 
sufficiently fostering macroeconomic stability by 
preserving external competitiveness. The recent 
turbulences on international financial markets 
and the signs of an accompanying credit crunch 
raise new concerns in this respect.   The 
conclusions of the paper underline that the euro 
anchor and the EU membership prospects play a 
positive macroeconomic stabilisation role for the 
Western Balkan economies. The positive 
economic performance from recent years tends to 
confirm that the preconditions for further 
catching-up and improvement of living standards 
are in place. However, the outcomes will depend 
very much on policy responses to current and 
future challenges.  This requires a stronger focus 
on sound fiscal policies and an acceleration of 
structural reforms so that these countries can 
reap the full benefits of the monetary stability 
imported from the euro zone. 2. HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 
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The 1990s were years of turmoil in the Western 
Balkans. The effects of three simultaneous crises, 
namely the breaking up of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (
1), war among or within 
successor republics, and the dismantling of the 
planned economy based on social ownership 
altogether led to GDP dropping sharply to pre-
1990 levels in all the former Yugoslav republics.  
In Croatia, it came down by end 1993 to 60% of 
its 1990 level.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
devastated by civil war, and in Serbia, notably in 
Kosovo, the shock was even harsher, with a drop 
of GDP to less than 45% of 1990 levels.  At the 
turn of the millennium, the legacy of the 1990's 
in the Western Balkans had become a difficult 
and challenging one. 
The Yugoslav federation's dismantling led to a 
fragmentation of a previously unitary economic 
space.  National currencies were introduced in 
Croatia in 1991 (the Croatian dinar, replaced by 
the kuna in May 1994) and in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1992 (the 
denar).  Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced its 
own dinar in 1992, and, following the 1995 
Dayton Peace Agreement, established a currency 
board arrangement and the convertible Mark 
(KM).  While these currencies were initially 
introduced at par with the Yugoslav dinar, this 
quickly changed given the instability of the latter 
and the emergence of hostilities in the region. 
Montenegro, the smaller of the two member 
states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
unilaterally declared the Deutsche Mark parallel 
legal tender to the Yugoslav dinar in November 
1999, in a period of high tension between 
Belgrade and Podgorica.  In 2001 the Deutsche 
Mark became sole legal tender, replaced by the 
euro in 2002.  In Kosovo, UNMIK introduced in 
1999 the DM, followed by the euro as of 2002, 
as the main currency in use with legal tender 
status.  
Newly established monetary institutions faced a 
tough job in establishing their credibility and 
 
(
1)  As mentioned previously, the paper looks at all the 
economies originating in the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia, which is a 
Member State, and including Albania as another 
potential candidate country. Turkey, another candidate 
country, is not covered because it does not share a 
similar historical and economical starting point. 
authority. Inflation had already reached high 
levels in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s.  In the 
period 1971-1991, the average annual inflation 
rate had been around 70%, and further 
accelerated towards the end of the period, with 
monthly inflation numbers of more than 50% in 
1989.  The situation aggravated under war 
conditions in the early 1990's with the 
monetisation of public deficits and wide-scale 
corruption.  Hyper-inflation in Serbia-
Montenegro (at the time still "the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia") in 1993-1994 
destroyed any possible remaining confidence in 
the national currency, reaching the record level 
of 313 million percent in the sole month of 
January 1994 and led to the closure and 
liquidation of numerous enterprises, including 
large banks.  In Croatia, one of the wealthiest 
countries of the region, inflation reached 1,500% 
in 1993, prompting severe adjustment measures 
which reduced it to 2% in 1995. 
The growing monetary "chaos" led to a situation 
characterized in the economic literature as 
"original sin", whereby a country cannot borrow 
in its currency abroad and can only borrow short-
term at home, with wide ranging and long lasting 
effects challenging attempts to restore economic 
stability. Moreover weak newly established 
central banks, with inexperienced and poorly 
equipped supervision departments were in a 
number of cases unable to prevent the eruption of 
severe financial crises.  The collapse of pyramid 
schemes in Albania and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia in the late 90's 
challenged macro-economic and financial 
stability and had a high price in terms of 
foregone growth.  
Economic agents reacted with distrust towards 
domestic currencies and financial institutions 
resulting in a wide scale recourse to cash 
holdings in foreign currencies, mainly the DM.  
Remittances denominated in DM or other 
European currencies became a major source of 
revenue – somewhat dampening the hardship of 
the crisis and were largely held in cash.  This 
vote of non-confidence against home currencies 
and local banks was certainly also influenced by 
the legacy of measures taken by the former 




frozen – de facto confiscated citizens' foreign 
currency holdings in domestic banks, estimated 
at the time at some DM 7 billion.  While a 
number of schemes were later introduced in the 
successor republics to compensate depositors 
with public bond schemes, in general 
compensation has been only partial.    Banks did 
not trust the local currencies either and bank 
credits became increasingly denominated in 
foreign currency (mainly euro at present). 
In such a situation, lost credibility and deep 
distrust would have been expected to make any 
stabilisation effort a long-term endeavour 
requiring an extended period of policy and 
institutional reforms to re-establish stability.  A 
remarkable feature of the region is however that 
macro-economic stability was rapidly restored in 
the late 1990's or after 2000, with some 
differences from country to country, the longest 
delays being recorded by Serbia.  While there are 
a number of explanatory factors for this swift 
restoration, not least the very positive role played 
by home macro-economic stabilisation policies 
supported by IMF programmes and the 
implementation of a wide range of structural 
reforms which helped reduce quasi-fiscal 
deficits, one should not underestimate the role 
that the DM and later the euro have played 
across the region as a core stabilising anchor. 
In general, the choice of the appropriate 
exchange rate arrangement of a country is a 
function of the economic characteristics, main 
macroeconomic policy objectives, and 
institutional arrangements.  The size and degree 
of openness of the economy, the flexibility of   
product and labour markets, the degree of capital 
mobility and development of financial markets 
and the need to achieve a sustainable level of 
macroeconomic stability are usually main factors 
in this context.  Being small and open 
economies, which were moving towards higher 
capital mobility and price and wage flexibility, 
played in favour of adopting fixed exchange rate 
solutions in the Western Balkans.  However, it 
was mainly the need to curb the very high 
inflation rates or even hyper-inflation resulting 
from an inappropriate policy mix or a 
procrastination of essential structural reforms in 
many of the economies, combined with lost 
confidence in local currencies and monetary 
institutions that tilted the balance towards using 
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.  The 
newly established monetary authorities in most 
cases had little choice but to anchor their national 
currency to an external one and thereby to 
recognise their limited room of manoeuvre in 
directing monetary developments.  Moreover, the 
need to reduce the volatility of the exchange 
rates represents a crucial aspect of enhancing 
macroeconomic stability and eliminating 
uncertainties for trade and capital formation.   
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia "de facto" pegged their currencies to 
the euro, although officially their exchange rates 
are managed floats.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
a currency board arrangement was introduced in 
1997, with the currency pegged to the Deutsche 
Mark and, as of 1 January 2002, to the euro.   
From 2003 to 2005, Serbia opted for a soft peg 
approach, pursuing a nominal depreciation of the 
dinar in order to stabilise the real exchange rate.  
More recently it has moved towards an inflation 
targeting regime.  In all cases, the base money 
coverage by central bank hard currency reserves 
has remained above 100%, meaning that even in 
countries which have avoided corner (hard) peg 
solutions, the monetary regime still retained 
some of the main features of a currency board.  
Initially Albania adopted a managed float 
approach with the aim of stabilising the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis a basket of currencies 
and, more recently, announced its intention to 
move towards an inflation targeting regime.   
Montenegro and Kosovo represent special cases 
with the use of the euro as legal tender.   
Under the new monetary regimes, inflation was 
progressively brought down close to EU levels, 
except for Serbia where stabilisation started only 
at end-2000 and inflation has been reduced 
gradually to a single-digit rate (6.8% at the end 
of 2007).  Pegs were overall remarkably 
sustainable.  Even in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, in spite of important 
foreign exchange tensions in the first half of 
2001 when civil hostilities erupted in the 
country, the Central Bank was eventually able to 
hold the (informal) peg with limited fluctuations 
and by the end of the year the exchange rate of 
the denar vis-à-vis the euro had broadly come 
back to pre-crisis levels.  At present Albania and 
Croatia are faced with domestic currency 
appreciation pressures owing to large capital 




The euro is present throughout the Western 
Balkan countries, either "de jure", through an 
official, albeit unilateral, introduction of the euro 
as sole legal tender or "de facto", through its use 
for savings, borrowing and cash payments, 
parallel to a domestic currency.  The wide use of 
the euro within the region might be attributable 
to several reasons, which include geographic 
proximity to the euro area, economic linkages, 
migration patterns, the desire to minimize risk, as 
well as strong historical determinants, as 
previously mentioned.  
3.1.  THE EURO AS TRADE INVOICING 
CURRENCY 
Strong trade links exist between the Western 
Balkan countries and the EU in general and the 
euro area in particular.  As a result, the use of the 
euro as an invoicing currency has facilitated the 
use of the euro in general.  Foreign trade of 
Western Balkan countries with the EU-27, as a 
percentage of total trade, ranged in 2007 from 
around 46% in Montenegro to 65% in Albania.  
Although the share of EU-27 trade has been 
declining somewhat since 2003, the average 
level stood at around 55% in the Western Balkan 
economies.  















* 2003 = SaM
There is only a small difference between the 
shares of exports and imports with EU-27. 
However, exports to the EU have a higher share 
than imports from the EU, also due to the 
importance of energy in the total import bill, 
which is usually a trade item outside of the trade 
relations with the EU-27 and which is playing a 
more prominent role due to the increase in 
international prices.  The share of exports and 
imports being invoiced in euro is even higher 
than what trade shares would suggest.   
Apparently for a certain amount of trade with 
non-EU countries the euro is also used as an 
invoicing currency.  For example, in the case of 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, for which data are available, the 
share of both exports and imports invoiced in 
euro stood at more than 70% of total exports and 
imports in 2005, gradually increasing from 2001. 










Exports to the euro area Exports invoiced in euro
Imports from the euro area Imports invoiced in euro
 
3.2.  THE EURO AS RESERVE CURRENCY 
Central banks of the region hold large shares of 
their foreign currency reserves in euro 
denominated assets.  This is a result of the role of 
the euro for trade invoicing, its role as a financial 
currency and the resulting prominent role of the 
euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the national 
currencies, as many countries of the region have 
oriented their monetary and exchange rate 
policies towards the euro.  An extreme case is 
Bosnia and Herzegovina where foreign exchange 
reserves denominated in euro account for 99.9% 
of total reserves in 2006 as the country maintains 
a currency board against the euro.   
The share of euro denominated foreign exchange 
reserves in total reserves has been rising 
significantly in all countries of the region since 
2002 and reached 86% in Croatia, 82% in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
55% in Albania.  An additional factor 
contributing to the growing role of the euro as a European Commission 
Occassional Paper 
  Box I.3.1: EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS AND ANCHORS OF MONETARY POLICY 
(as of January 2008)
External anchor 
Euro as legal tender 
(1): 
  Montenegro, 
  Kosovo (UNSCR 1244) 
Currency board arrangement: 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Tightly managed float (de facto peg): 
  Croatia, 
  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Managed float 
  Serbia (Inflation targeting framework) 
Independent floating 
  Albania (Inflation targeting framework) 
 
 
(1)  Reference to EU position on this matter (November 2000 ECOFIN + Council Declaration to SAA with Montenegro). 
 
reserve currency might be the growing share of 
euro denominated debt in total foreign debt of 
Western Balkan countries, reaching 45% for 
Croatia, 61% for the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia and 75% for Serbia in 2006.  In 
addition, the strong inflow of foreign direct 
investment from the EU into the region during 
recent years has probably also contributed to the 
growing role of the euro as a reserve currency. 
3.3.  THE EURO AS EXCHANGE RATE AND 
MONETARY ANCHOR 
A cursory look at the exchange rate 
arrangements in the Western Balkans shows that 
the euro represents a widely used external anchor 
in the economies (see table above).  
Montenegro and Kosovo use the euro as legal 
tender, as a result of its unilateral introduction in 
the former and, in the later, UNMIK's decision to 
use the euro as legal tender. The ECOFIN 
Council noted that the present use of the euro 
decided by the Montenegrin authorities in 
exceptional circumstances is fully distinct from 
euro area membership and unilateral 
"euroisation" is not compatible with the Treaty. 
The current de facto use of the euro in 
Montenegro does not prejudge EU's position on 
how to address this issue in possible future 
accession negotiations. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the domestic currency is pegged to 
the euro under a currency board arrangement, 
which has functioned smoothly since 1997.  In 
addition, Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia have "de facto" pegged 
their currencies to the euro, although officially 
their exchange rates are managed floats.  The 
tolerance of the two central banks for exchange 
rate movements has been relatively low and 
foreign exchange interventions, open market 
operations and interest rate adjustments have 
been used frequently.  Consequently, the 
exchange rates of the kuna and the Macedonian 
denar (MKD) have remained fairly stable over 
the past 10 years and have de facto served as a 
stabilisation device.   
Albania and Serbia are the only countries which 
have gradually allowed their currencies to float 
more freely, as they have both announced a 
move towards an explicit inflation targeting 
regime.  In Albania, the central bank intervenes 
in the foreign exchange market only occasionally 
with the objective of smoothing temporary 
fluctuations and in order to accumulate foreign 
currency reserves.  The National Bank of Serbia 
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continued to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market in a more systematic way, in order to 
contain the appreciation of the Serbian denar as a 
result of strong capital inflows. 
 
ncountered by soft pegs.   
                                                          
As already depicted in the introductory chapter, 
the use of the Deutsche Mark and subsequently 
the euro as an external anchor in the economies, 
together with the adoption of stabilisation 
programmes, also based on the sound policies 
promoted under the EMU, was instrumental in 
swiftly achieving macroeconomic stability after 
periods of very high or even hyper-inflation.   
The Western Balkan experience lends support to 
the traditional view that pegging to a low-
inflation country would help promote and 
maintain fiscal and monetary discipline, rather 
than to other theories advanced more 
recently. (
1) At the same time, the gradual 
liberalisation of capital movements in the region, 
together with the build-up of balance sheet risks 
as a result of the widespread use of the euro as 
financial currency and unhedged foreign 
borrowing, reduced the scope for an 
"independent" monetary policy even more. The 
concept of the open-economy trilemma 
emphasized by Obstfeld (1998), i.e. the 
impossibility for a country to simultaneously 
have a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and 
the monetary policy guided towards domestic 
objectives, has become an unchallenged part of 
mainstream economics and  explains the inherent 
difficulties e
3.4.  THE EURO AS FINANCIAL CURRENCY 
Private households in the Western Balkan 
countries keep a significant amount of their total 
deposits and borrow a large proportion of their 
total credit in foreign currency.  In general, over 
the last few years the use of the euro in domestic 
financial markets of the Western Balkans has 
been growing significantly, displacing other 
foreign currencies.  On average about 60% of 
total deposits and 70% of total loans in these 
countries were denominated in, or indexed to the 
 
(
1)  Tornell and Velasco (2000) claimed that fiscal discipline 
could not be ensured by pegged arrangements due to a 
time bias factor, i.e. the eventual outcome – devaluation 
– is likely to occur not shortly, but at a remote point in 
time.  
euro in 2006.  The share of foreign currency 
loans in total loans is on average higher than the 
corresponding share of foreign currency deposits.  
However, the shares of euro denominated or 
indexed deposits and loans vary widely between 
countries of the region.  For example, in Albania 
the share in total deposits stood at around 23% in 
2006 compared to 63% in Serbia and close to 
100% in Kosovo and Montenegro.  
Graph I.3.3:EUR-denominated and EUR-indexed 











For loans, this number ranged between around 
49% in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and 68% in Serbia.  In Montenegro, 
which has unilaterally introduced the euro, not 
surprisingly almost 100% of all loans are 
denominated in euro. 
Graph I.3.4:EUR-denominated and EUR-indexed 
desposits
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The relatively high share of euro deposits may 
reflect a lack of confidence in the domestic 
currency as a store of value.  This seems to be 
particularly prevalent in countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, in particular in Croatia, Serbia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  In 
particular in these countries, the euro changeover 
may have contributed to a transitory increase in 
foreign currency deposits as authorities 
encouraged households to deposit any legacy 
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currency cash holdings, mostly Deutsche mark 
and Austrian schilling, formerly kept "under the 
mattress" in banks, rather than exchange them 
directly for new euro banknotes.  However, since 
2002 the share of euro deposits in total deposits 
has declined gradually in the region, as 
confidence in the domestic currency gradually 
recovered.  Nevertheless, several studies have 
identified a hysteresis effect, i.e. a memory of 
long past banking crises that sharply devalued or 
wiped out savings, with the foreign currency 
denominated share of deposits and loans 
generally changing slowly, often irrespective of 
the success in restoring monetary stability. Given 
the difficult legacy of the 1990's in former 
Yugoslav republics, this may indeed have played 
a significant role in those countries. 
While the share of euro deposits has been 
declining, the share of euro-denominated and 
indexed loans has been growing in recent years 
in several countries.  This is partly a reflection of 
the strong and growing presence of foreign 
banks, mostly from euro area countries, which 
have been supporting credit growth in the form 
of euro denominated lending, also helped by a 
favourable interest rate differential. 
 
Graph I.3.5:EUR-denominated and EUR-indexed 











Although households account for most of the 
euro deposits, non-financial corporations 
represent the lion's share in drawing euro loans.  
However, in a few countries households borrow 
significantly in foreign currency as well, either 
for consumption or mortgages purposes.  The 
presence of foreign-owned banks, offering euro 
denominated loans at interest rates below those 
denominated in national currency, probably 
represents the crucial factor behind the increase 
in the use of the euro in local loan contracts. 
  There are several implications related to the 
substantial use of the euro as a financial currency 
in parallel to a domestic one.  A large share of 
euro-denominated savings and loans reduce the 
efficiency of monetary policies using the interest 
rate channel, since central bank interest rate 
policies only influence trends in savings and 
loans denominated in local currency. 
  
Graph I.3.6:EUR-denominated and EUR-indexed 
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For lasting macroeconomic stability to be 
achieved, monetary policy must operate 
primarily through other channels or receive 
greater support from other policy areas.  In 
addition, the widespread use of euro-
denominated instruments, particularly for 
borrowing, is a potential source of financial 
instability for the countries affected.  This is 
especially true when borrowers have no euro 
income or no way of hedging their currency 
exposure. While financial institutions are usually 
required to limit their foreign currency 
mismatches or hedge them, their clients and 
especially the households are not subject to 
similar strict rules. As a result, a depreciating 
exchange rate may restore some of the country's 
external competitiveness, but at the same time 
puts borrowers at risk. They can face solvency 
problems, which in turn represent an indirect 
credit risk for the banks that granted these loans.  
Essentially, the widespread use of the euro as a 
financial currency in the Western Balkans is, in 
most parts, a reflection of the process of financial 
integration between the region and the euro area. 
3.5.  THE EURO AS PARALLEL CASH 
It is difficult to obtain hard data on euro cash 
holdings outside the euro area.  Surveys and 
econometric models can be methodologically 
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used for this purpose.  For example cash 
holdings can be estimated using models that are 
applied to national accounts and monetary data 
(Feige, 2003).  The results obtained by Feige 
point to relatively high currency substitution 
rates in several transition economies.   
Substitution rates range from about 20% to 
above 50%. Another approach involves direct 
questioning households and then projecting the 
extent of currency substitution from the survey 
results.  This approach has been used by the 
Austrian National Banks (OeNB) since 1997.  At 
the start of the OeNB survey series, a sizeable 
share of the respondents held cash in foreign 
currency, primarily Deutsche mark, Austrian 
schilling and U.S. dollar.  When the euro was 
introduced, Deutsche mark and Austrian 
schilling holdings were to a large extent 
exchanged for euro or domestic currency, but 
rarely for U.S. dollar.  According to the OeNB 
survey, households in countries of the former 
Yugoslavia have the highest volumes of cash 
holdings among European transition economies.  
This can be explained by the fact that the euro 
tends to fulfil a general reserve function or to be 
used for domestic transactions, in former 
Yugoslavia countries, whereas euro cash 
holdings in the other countries are used mainly 
for spending and vacations abroad.  Survey data 
also indicates that the share of households with 
euro cash holdings is higher for those with 
relatives in euro area countries than for those 
with no family ties abroad, suggesting that such 
holdings may stem, at least partially, from 
remittances from family members abroad.  In 
addition, an upward trend in euro cash holdings 
in the Western Balkans since 2002 was detected, 
with the proportion of respondents holding euros 
having reached 25% in Croatia at the end of 
2006, well above the proportion of respondents 
holding dollars. 4.  IMPROVED ECONOMIC STABILITY AND 
PERFORMANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
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In the aftermath of the crises in the nineties, the 
Western Balkans were faced with strong and 
urgent challenges of economic adjustment and 
stabilisation.  The introduction of new monetary 
regimes based on the DM and later the euro 
helped curb previously rampant inflation to 
almost EU levels. Both the official use of the 
euro – as exchange rate anchor and reserve 
currency – and the unofficial use by the private 
sector – as parallel cash or financial currency 
were key in avoiding an economic collapse in the 
first stages of the Yugoslav crises and 
subsequently helped remonetise the economies, 
rebuild domestic savings and promote deeper 
financial and trade integration with the EU.  At 
the same time, the wide-spread use of the 
DM/euro as financial currency or parallel cash 
complicated the mechanisms of monetary 
transmission at a later stage and facilitated the 
accumulation of balance-sheet risks.   
Nonetheless, the overall result has been 
improved macroeconomic stability and fairly 
robust economic growth, despite the challenges 
that are inherent to a rapid catching-up process. 
In addition, the EU membership prospects have 
increased the Western Balkans' attention to the 
European Monetary Union's objectives, 
standards and economic surveillance 
instruments. The candidate and potential 
candidate countries from the Western Balkans 
are becoming increasingly aware of the need for 
a rapid real convergence towards EU Member 
States' income levels, while targeting in parallel a 
medium-term nominal convergence towards EU 
standards, in particular those highlighted by the 
Maastricht criteria.  The successful candidates 
need to fulfil, among other, the Copenhagen 
economic criteria, which require the existence of 
a functioning market economy and the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces in the EU.  For that purpose, candidate 
and potential candidate countries from the 
Western Balkans are pursuing a wide-range of 
reforms in order to achieve macroeconomic 
stability, liberalise markets, restructure and 
privatise the state-owned industries, improve 
their business environment and build human and 
physical capital.  These reforms are key for 
preserving stability in the face of growing 
external imbalances and rapid financial 
deepening. Being part of the accession process, 
where progress in economic, social and political 
areas is closely monitored by the European 
Commission, represents an additional guarantee 
to investors and international capital markets that 
the Western Balkan economies are pursuing 
sound public policies.  This further reinforces 
credibility and financial stability in the region. 
As accession draws nearer, the candidate and 
potential candidate countries from the Western 
Balkans are gradually being integrated in the 
multilateral surveillance and economic policy co-
ordination procedures of the European Monetary 
Union
1.  In this context, the European 
Commission has established jointly with the 
candidate and potential candidate countries a pre-
accession fiscal surveillance procedure.  This 
surveillance framework includes various 
components, depending on the individual status 
in the accession process, with the candidate 
countries following more closely, but in a 
simplified manner, the permanent fiscal 
surveillance procedures for Member States.  The 
candidate countries prepare Pre-accession 
Economic Programmes and Fiscal notifications, 
participate in bilateral and multilateral economic 
dialogues and may benefit from macro-financial 
assistance.  The potential candidate countries 
prepare Economic and Fiscal Programmes, 
participate in bilateral economic dialogues and 
some benefited from macro-financial assistance 
as well. Together with the programmes and 
frameworks used by other international 
institutions, such as the IMF, the fiscal 
surveillance framework put in place by the 
European Commission plays an important role in 
fostering macro-economic stability and catching-
up in the Western Balkans. 
4.1.  RAPID DISINFLATION TO EURO AREA 
LEVELS 
Irrespective of the systemic settings, the policy 
mix in the Western Balkan economies has 
 
1    For more details, please see the second paper in the 
publication. Part I 
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become gradually much more transparent and 
consistent, which helped them gain stability and 
credibility.  In contrast to the episodes of very 
high and even hyperinflation in the early 1990's, 
inflation came down significantly in almost all 
Western Balkan economies.  Sizeable differences 
between the individual economies are due to 
country specific features, including exchange 
rate regimes and the tightness of the monetary 
and fiscal policy mix. 
 













As stabilisation took hold in the Western Balkan 
countries, annual inflation was fairly quickly and 
substantially reduced to moderate rates until 
2006, in all the economies but Serbia.  The fall in 
inflation rates was rather steady in the region, 
except for some temporary flare-ups in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.  In the former, the 
introduction of VAT and increases in 
administered prices led to a temporary surge in 
inflation in 2006, which however receded 
significantly in 2007.  In the latter, the impact of 
increases in excise duties in 2006 was phased out 
in the first half of 2007.  
Nonetheless, the re-emergence of inflationary 
pressures led by food and oil prices on a global 
scale in the second half of 2007 affected also the 
Western Balkans. In the first quarter of 2008, 
inflation accelerated to above 11% year-on-year 
in Serbia, Kosovo and 9.5% in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and rose above 
6% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 8% in 
Montenegro. In Albania and Croatia, although an 
increase in inflation also took place, it remained 
moderate. The inflation rise above increases 
recorded in the EU, despite the euro pegs, 
reflects primarily the higher share of food and 
energy prices in the local CPI baskets. In 
addition, other factors are at work, such as the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect and the much higher 
growth rates of domestic demand fuelled by the 
large capital inflows and the rapid growth of 
credit.  In some economies, the liberalisation of 
administered prices will still play an important 
role in terms of nominal price convergence with 
the euro area in the following years.  
4.2.  CONSOLIDATED FISCAL STANCE 
Given the narrow margin for autonomous 
monetary policies, the onus throughout the 
region has been mostly on fiscal policies to 
provide the core macroeconomic policy stance.  
This was all the more necessary given: (i) 
sizeable general government deficits at the turn 
of the century; (ii) heavy governments and public 
sectors, requiring some downsizing of public 
expenditure, in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; and (iii) sizeable current account 
deficits with the ensuing need to curb down 
internal demand growth. 
 
















Over the recent years, domestic policies, 
supported by IMF programmes, have overall 
been tightened and provided for a fiscal 
consolidation.  A sizeable adjustment took place 
in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but 
more recently also in Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Croatia.  Kosovo remains a special case with a 
high volatility of budget outcomes and, at times, 
unintentional fiscal tightening given the 
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difference between planned and executed 
budgets.  
However, the pattern of fiscal consolidation has 
been quite different among countries.  Overall in 
the region, from 2000 to 2007 fiscal 
consolidation was mainly achieved through a 
mix of expenditure reduction as a share of GDP 
and revenue increases in candidate countries, 
whereas potential candidate countries mainly 
relied on growing revenues boosted by buoyant 
tax collection. 
  
















This fiscal consolidation enabled a reduction in 
public debt down to more sustainable levels 
throughout the region.  In Serbia and 
Montenegro, favourable agreements reached 
with the Paris Club (66% debt reduction) and the 
London club further allowed for a spectacular 
reduction of public sovereign debt.  Yet, some 
countries are still facing significant contingent 
liabilities, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where war related claims on the governments 
and other domestic liabilities could substantially 
add to official debt figures and call for prudent 
fiscal policies.  Kosovo under the UN 
administration has not serviced any international 
claims, nor issued any public borrowing, but it 
may inherit, at some stage, a share of sovereign 
liabilities currently serviced by Serbia. 
4.3.  TRENDS IN THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
In recent years, the currencies of the Western 
Balkan economies showed, in terms of CPI, a 
trend of real appreciation vis-à-vis the euro, 
which is much less pronounced when unit labour 
costs are used as a basis for comparison.   
Montenegro and Albania recorded a substantial 
real appreciation of the exchange rate against the 
euro between 1999 and 2007, mainly due to 
higher inflation rates than in the euro area. 
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In Montenegro, the real exchange rate 
appreciation was the largest at about 45%, 
whereas the Serbian Denar depreciated strongly 
mainly as a result of the exchange rate crisis of 
1999-2001 when the exchange rate collapsed 
following the war in Kosovo.    
 














Nonetheless, significant gains in terms of labour 
productivity offset wage increases and the 
evolution of the real exchange rates in terms of 
ULC is generally more favourable than in terms 
of CPI.  In Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the 
real exchange rate appreciation in terms of ULC 
was below or around 10% in the analysed period, 
showing a relatively sound interconnection 
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between the evolution of labour productivity, 
wages and the exchange rate.   
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Only in Montenegro, Albania and Serbia, real 
exchange rates (based on ULC) have appreciated 
against the euro by large amounts – around 100% 
in the first economy and 45% in the last two – 
mainly due to a hefty growth of labour costs. 
  















   
The external competitiveness of these economies 
was affected, but the magnitude of the impact 
can only be assessed indirectly, as the real 
exchange rate analysis encompasses only trends 
and not levels.  By looking at complementary 
indicators it appears that the Serbian and 
Albanian economies have maintained 
competitiveness by gradually shifting production 
and exports into higher value-added sectors, 
whereas the Montenegrin one is developing a 
competitive tourism industry while its export 
capacity remains limited, mainly consisting of 
low-processed goods. 
 
There was a general upward trend in the growth 
rate of exports of goods and services from 2005 
to 2007 in all the economies, except for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Over the period, the growth of 
exports was fairly robust, with a double digit 
average growth rate being recorded in all 
economies, except for Croatia and Kosovo.   
Exports grew on average by around 9% in 
Croatia and were declining in Kosovo until 2006, 
when the trend reversed and the Kosovan exports 
of goods and services grew by a double-digit 
rate, although from still very low levels. 
  
Graph I.4.8: Exports of goods and services














The evolution of exports demonstrates the 
gradual improvement of the export capacity of 
the economies.  However, exports to the 
European Union grew slower than to the world 
on average, with the exceptions of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia, showing that other factors, such as 
geographical proximity, previous strong regional 
trade links and new regional trade agreements or 
structure of exports also play an important role in 
this process rather than only pegged exchange 
rates. 
 
Graph I.4.9: Exports to EU
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4.4.  REDUCTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
AND UNCERTAINTY 
The large economic base of the euro and the 
elimination of the transaction costs involved with 
multiple exchange rates have increased gradually 
the use of the euro as a unit of account in the 
denomination of foreign trade flows in the 
Western Balkans (see sub-chapter 3.1).    The 
euro facilitated trade between the Western 
Balkans and the EU by eliminating exchange rate 
uncertainty, allowing companies to compare 
costs and save money on foreign exchange 
hedging.  In this respect, the benefits are usually 
more pronounced for small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  Benefits are – to some extent – 
visible in export statistics where the exports from 
the Western Balkans to the euro area and the EU 
in general have been on an increasing trend in 
recent years.  However, it seems that other 
factors such as further integration of regional 
trade and the relatively slow improvement of the 
structure and quality of exports did not allow the 
Western Balkan economies to fully tap into the 
growth of the EU markets in 2006 and 2007. The 
signing of Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements with all the countries in the region 
should give another boost to the process of trade 
integration between the EU and the Western 
Balkans. 
4.5.  REMONETISATION OF ECONOMIES AND 
REBUILDING OF DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
 
As in the new Member States, remonetisation is 
a key element in the overall transition process of 
the Western Balkan economies.  In tandem with 
the disinflation process, which increased 
confidence in the domestic currencies, the money 
stock in Western Balkan countries started to rise.  
The levels of base money (M0) vary greatly 
amongst the Western Balkan countries.  Relative 
to GDP, the levels are around the highest in 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro.  Since 2000, the fastest growth was 
observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.  It is part of financial sector 
transformation at large.  This process has also 
contributed to the fairly strong output growth in 
recent years that was mainly driven by domestic 
demand (both private consumption and fixed 
capital formation) and accompanied by external 
imbalances in most countries.  

















The broad money aggregates have also increased 
strongly in most economies, and as such, it may 
reflect increased confidence in the banking 
sector.  The highest growth rates were recorded 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Kosovo and in particular in Montenegro.  In the 
latter, the very large inflows of foreign capital 
relative to GDP, both as foreign direct 
investment and lending, contributed to a massive 
increase in the money supply from around 30% 
in 2003 to almost 120% in 2007. The money 
multiplier (relationship between narrow and 
broad money) is fairly low in Albania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in comparison with the other 
countries in the region, most likely as a result of 
lower cross-border financial integration in the 
former and as a consequence of the currency 
board constraints in the latter.     
Western Balkan economies are, like most typical 
transition economies, characterized by saving 
ratios which are in the low to medium range.   
The economic transformation of the former 
centrally planned economies is evidenced by a 
fundamental reallocation of resources and deep 
economic structural change.  Within this process, 
also the amount of domestic savings has 
increased, primarily mirrored by the gradual 
increase in the ratio of time deposits as a share of 
GDP. On the other hand, the savings-to-GDP 
ratio as captured by the national accounts 
statistics is still low or even negative in 
economies like Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia, mainly 
reflecting the large share of domestic 
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consumption  financed to a large extent by 
foreign resources. 
 





















The only countries which have normalised their 
saving behaviour as revealed by the national 
accounts appear to be Albania, Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
4.6.  HIGHER FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND 
INFLOW OF FOREIGN SAVINGS 
Despite their increase, domestic savings are still 
not sufficient to cover the significant investment 
needs in the Western Balkans. Access of the 
economies to the international financial markets 
appears to have been facilitated by the expansion 
of global liquidity in recent years.  The most 
advanced Western Balkan economies (in 
particular Croatia) have clearly benefited from 
this process and have been able to attract 
significant foreign capital, including FDI.  The 
bulk of these inflows originated from the euro 
area. It remains to be seen how the inflow of net 
FDI, which has increased strongly in the region 
so far, would be affected by the recent 
international credit crunch and the prospects of a 
global economic slowdown. 
 
 
















The creation of a wider, deeper, and more liquid 
financial market in the euro area reduced 
transaction and borrowing costs also for 
borrowers from the Western Balkans.  In Croatia, 
the non-bank private sector is financing its needs 
increasingly abroad and in euro. Also in other 
economies, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Serbia, the level of cross-border 
lending to the domestic private sector has 
increased to more meaningful levels. Albania 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
are trailing the group in this respect. The whole 
process needs to be seen in the context of 
improved economic performance and eligibility 
for foreign financing of domestic companies 
following the privatisation and restructuring 
process. Sometimes, the measures taken by 
central banks to curb the growth of domestic 
credit have also played an important role in 
stimulating cross-border lending. 

















Not only the private sector, but also the public 
one has found its way to tap the euro 
denominated sovereign bonds market.  Croatia 
was particularly successful issuing EUR 2.25 
billion worth of Eurobonds since 2001.  
 




4.7.  ROBUST ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Economic growth in the Western Balkan 



















After initial output losses as a result of the 
violent conflicts of the region and initial 
transition steps, the economies started to quickly 
stabilise, and the average growth rate inched up 
from about 3% in 2003 to close to 6% in 2007. 
Growth in the region is particularly supported by 
the EU accession perspective which promotes 
sound economic policies and increased amounts 
of FDI, thus contributing decisively to the 
modernisation of productive capacities in the 
region. 
 
















However, the growth potential in the region 
remains lower than in the Baltics or other New 
Member States, which have been growing faster 
in recent years. In particular, if the lower starting 
point in terms of GDP per capita in PPP (as a 
share of the EU average) is taken into account 
(except for Croatia), the Western Balkans appear 
as a region which still needs to unleash its 
growth potential. 
 
 5. FUTURE  CHALLENGES 
 
19 
As described in previous sections, the use of the 
DM and later the euro – be it as an anchor 
currency or via de jure or de facto euroisation - 
has helped promote economic stabilisation in the 
countries concerned.  For small open economies 
such as the Western Balkan economies, in 
particular with their history of rampant inflation 
and continuous depreciations, using an 
"independent" monetary and exchange rate 
policy as a tool for inflation management or 
external competitiveness purposes is indeed not 
likely to be a realistic option. Devaluating the 
domestic currency cannot represent a universal 
panacea and an adequate substitute for the 
necessary market adjustment of relative prices.   
In addition, the alleged blessings of devaluation 
can only be temporary and once domestic prices 
and wages adjust to the new equilibrium, the 
previous "competitive" advantage is cancelled.   
But just like in the case of the euro area, 
exchange rate stability in itself will not promote 
stability and durable growth. In addition to sound 
fiscal policies, appropriate wage and price 
policies need to be in place, together with, well-
functioning goods and labour markets to allow 
for an efficient adjustment of relative prices.  For 
this reason, the remainder of the chapter takes 
stock of the adequate functioning of markets in 
the Western Balkans and tries to assess whether 
external competitiveness came under pressure in 
the context of rapid economic catching-up and 
financial deepening. 
5.1.  ADEQUATE FUNCTIONING OF MARKETS 
IS KEY 
Several Western Balkan economies, including 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro are 
relatively advanced with respect to increasing 
private ownership and aligning legislation with 
the EU acquis.  Others like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo or Serbia are less so.   
Nonetheless, the remaining challenges in 
ensuring an adequate functioning of markets are 
significant in all of them.  In most countries, 
labour markets are not flexible enough, while 
wages in the registered economy are subject to a 
relatively high taxation of labour and distorted 
wage setting mechanisms. Under these 
circumstances, competitiveness is most likely 
facilitated by the considerable informal sector. 
However, the "flexibility" provided by the 
informal sector comes at the cost of inadequate 
social protection for the unofficial employees 
and foregone revenues to the budgets.  
The liberalisation of network industries is still 
on-going as well as the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises, with mixed results across the 
board.  The weak capacities of the public sector 
and the judiciary impede swift structural change 
and an adequate protection of ownership rights.  
Furthermore, applying the necessary supervisory 
and prudential standards in the financial sector 
seems to be still challenging for the domestic 
institutions in charge, although the situation is 
gradually improving. 
Private ownership of companies is generally 
regarded as more efficient and better able to react 
to changing market conditions than state 
ownership.  In the Western Balkans, the 
transition to market economy started later than in 
Central and Eastern Europe and on average took 
longer to achieve a critical mass of privatised 
companies in the economy. At present, the 
private sector's share of output has reached a 
relatively high level, particularly in Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Albania and Montenegro. However, even in the 
more advanced economies, sectors remain where 
privatisation and restructuring have progressed 
only slowly, such as the shipbuilding sector in 
Croatia, the oil sector in Albania or the railway 
sector in general.  The liberalisation of network 
industries is deeper in telecommunications, but 
less so in the energy and utilities sectors.  The 
weight of the private sector is clearly insufficient 
in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 
particular in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) and to a smaller extent in Kosovo. 
As a result, quasi fiscal deficits remain 
significant in the sector of state-owned 
enterprises, as well as the budget subsidies which 
represent the life-line of unviable companies.  
Most of the countries of the region, have made 
substantial efforts and progress in improving the European Commission 
Occassional Paper 
entry and exit procedures of their economy. (
1)  
With respect to the duration and the costs of 
enterprise registration, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia is the most advanced 
country in the region, while most others have 
made important progress in recent years.  Only 
Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be a clear 
laggard in the group.  In terms of time and cost 
required to solve bankruptcies, the best 
positioned country is Montenegro, while the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Albania are trailing the group.  
Registration of property rights and enforcement 
of contracts are two areas where the Western 
Balkans score fairly low in comparison with the 
OECD countries.  This impacts negatively their 
capacity to foster domestic and foreign 
investment, diminishing the adjustment potential 
of the economies.  Only Croatia, Albania and to 
a certain extent the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia have made more progress on average 
in these areas. 
Overall the capacity of the Western Balkan 
economies to react swiftly to domestic or 
external shocks is hampered by an insufficient 
degree of market flexibility, although significant 
progress was made in recent years.  In particular 
the labour markets suffer from structural 
rigidities, whereas all the economies lag behind 
the OECD countries and progress has been fairly 
slow.  The liberalisation of markets for goods has 
been more dynamic as well as the improvements 
in the business environment in general.  The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Montenegro seem to be more advanced in the 
process, while in particular Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and to some extent Albania need to 
accelerate the pace of reforms. 
 
                                                           
(
1) See also the World Bank's Doing Business 2009 at 
www.doingbusiness.org 
5.2. CATCHING-UP  PROCESS 
ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE EXTERNAL 
IMBALANCES AND RAPID FINANCIAL 
DEEPENING 
5.2.1.    External  imbalances 
Trade and current account deficits were quite 
high in the economies in the past years.  On 
average, between 2003 and 2007, all economies 
recorded a trade deficit above 20% of GDP, in 
some cases being as high as 40% of GDP.  In 
general, the current account deficits were much 
lower, due to positive balances in services – in 
particular in tourism, ample worker remittances 
and official transfers which were significant 
mainly for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Nevertheless, the size of the current account 
deficits was significant in all the economies, with 
the exception of the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.  On average, it exceeded double-
digit levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Serbia during 2003 – 2007. 
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The sizeable external imbalances are closely 
linked to the countries' status of catching-up 
economies and the robust inflows of foreign 
capital.  These imbalances may not be 
necessarily triggered by a loss of external 
competitiveness, especially as the performance 
of exports was favourable.  With the exception of 
Kosovo which only recorded a positive growth 
rate of exports in 2006 and 2007, in the other 
economies the exports of goods and services 
grew at a healthy pace during the past five years.  
This is mainly the result of the restructuring of 
domestic productive capacities with the help of 
foreign direct investment and the favourable 
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evolution of international prices for certain 
commodities and in particular for base metals.   
In addition, as described in the previous section, 
the evolution of the real exchange rate in terms 
of unit labour costs between 2000 and 2007 
suggests that external competitiveness was to a 
large extent preserved in most of the Western 
Balkan economies, but less so in Montenegro, 
Albania and Serbia. External competitiveness 
may come under additional strain in light of the 
recent increases in energy prices, given the high 
energy intensity of these economies. The 
composition of exports remains skewed in favour 
of lower value-added goods.  The share of capital 
and technology intensive goods in total exports 
increased only modestly in recent years, and 
except for Croatia and to a certain extent Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the overall level 
remains quite low.  
Graph I.5.2:Export of Capital and Technology Intensive Goods
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On the other hand, the sustainability of the 
deficits depends crucially on the composition of 
imports and their financing structure, i.e. the 
share of foreign direct investment and other non-
debt creating financial flows, which ideally 
should support the creation of a robust 
productive basis. Imports of capital goods play a 
different role in the countries' imports and in 
most cases their share declined recently, as a 
result of strong dynamics in household 
consumption.  Nonetheless, the current levels 
hint at an import structure which is relatively 
favourable to the increase of the production 
potential of the economies over the medium 
term.  Country-specific differences are not so 
large with the exception of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia which exhibits a 
relatively lower import content of investment 
goods.  
 
Graph I.5.3:Import of investment goods
















FDI inflows have been on the rise in the Western 
Balkans between 2003 and 2007, mainly as a 
result of an improving business environment, 
accelerated privatisation and ample global 
liquidity coupled with a buoyant investor 
sentiment.  In all economies except for Albania 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
net FDI exceeded on average 5% of GDP 
between 2003 and 2007.   About half of the very 
high levels of FDI recorded in Montenegro in 
2005 - 2007 went into real estate activities.  The 
coverage of current account deficits with net FDI 
over the period was fairly good in Montenegro, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Croatia and Serbia. 
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External indebtedness relative to GDP has been 
on a declining trend in the region from 2003 to 
2007, despite the sizeable external deficits that 
were recorded.  The good coverage of deficits 
with non-debt creating financial inflows, 
diminishing public external debt and robust GDP 
growth facilitated this trend.  Only in Croatia 
external debt-to-GDP increased over the period 
despite its already high level.  Croatia stands out 
in the group as the country with the largest 
external burden.  Nonetheless, the sizeable 
foreign assets of the banking system imply that 
Croatia's "net" external debt is significantly 
lower than suggested above.  Moreover, most of 
the economies display a rather comfortable level 
of official foreign exchange reserves, exceeding 
four months of imports of goods and services.  In 
Montenegro and Kosovo, the cushion provided 
by official reserves is relatively lower than in the 
other economies, mainly because of their special 
monetary arrangements. Due to the unilateral use 
of the euro, the Montenegrin and Kosovan 
monetary authority do not need to back a 
domestic currency by foreign official reserves.  














5.2.2.    A process of rapid financial 
deepening  
Albeit starting from low levels, credit growth is 
high or relatively high in the region and has 
maintained this trend even after the financial 
turmoil started to affect the international capital 
markets in late-2007. In recent years, banks have 
been increasingly expanding their asset portfolio 
into more risky investments and competition for 
market shares sharpened in the region which 
could result in a deterioration of the quality of 
loan portfolios.  In addition, the large degree of 
lending in foreign currency makes systems 
vulnerable to excessive exchange rate volatility.  
Even though, in general, banks are well hedged 
against the foreign exchange risk and their net 
open positions in foreign currency are limited, 
their clients, which are increasingly households, 
are often less hedged.  Some of the economies 
experienced banking crises in the recent past, 
increasing the depositors’ apprehension.  Also, 
not long ago state directed and connected lending 
still represented commonplace practices in many 
of the banking systems in the region.   
 





















One of the factors mitigating these risks is the 
large degree of bank privatisation that took place 
in the region, especially when international 
reputable banks became the new owners.  In 
addition, the regulatory and supervisory 
capacities of the authorities were significantly 
strengthened in most of the economies, but there 
are still some concerns about the independence 
of supervisors and the degree of implementation 
of the new and improved regulations. In 2008, 
some countries like Montenegro, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina took monetary policy or 
administrative measures to reduce the speed of 
credit growth, but their success can only be 
traced in Montenegro so far, where the average 
monthly growth rate of domestic credit declined 
from about 10% in 2007 to 3% in the first quarter 
of 2008. The more restrictive lending conditions 
on the international capital markets did not 
appear to have a visible impact in the region so 
far and even assuming it had one - within 
reasonable limits, it would actually provide some 
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support to the authorities which strive for a 
slowdown of domestic credit growth.  
Domestic credit has been growing relatively fast 
in the entire region.  In the past three years, 
Montenegro, Albania, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia, 
posted very high annualised credit growth rates 
which exceeded 30% on average.  The other 
economies, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 
experienced a more moderate dynamic of credit 
but still at double digit annualised rates.  Credit 
growth is driven by the private sector component 
in most of the economies and in particular by 
household lending.  In 2007, household credit 
grew by close to 155% in Montenegro and 60% 
in Albania.  Lending in foreign currency or 
indexed to foreign currency is widespread in the 
economies and also grew very fast on average in 
Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Montenegro between 2005 and 
2007.   
In some of the economies such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and in 
particular Croatia, an increased amount of cross-
border lending flows directly into the non-bank 
sector.  This adds to the already high levels of 
domestic foreign currency lending in the region, 
which exceeded two thirds of total domestic 
credit in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Serbia in 2007. In certain cases, the 
more dynamic cross-border lending represented a 
response to internal restrictions, including high 
reserve requirements or credit ceilings imposed 
by central banks, aimed at reducing domestic 
credit growth or redirecting it into domestic 
currency.  As a result, now the balance sheets of 
domestic credit institutions reflect only partially 
the outstanding foreign currency assets and the 
risks assumed in the economy. As mentioned 
before, this large and increasing component of 
lending in foreign currency complicates policy-
making and adds to macroeconomic risks.   
 
The corporate sector is still predominant in the 
allocation of credit, but the dynamics are skewed 
in favour of the households.  The 2007 data 
shows that the allocation of credit between 
household and enterprise sectors is still 
conducive to economic growth in most of the 
Western Balkans, with the enterprise sector 
claiming close to or more than 60% of total 
private credit in all the economies, except for 
Croatia where it was slightly above 40% at the 
end of 2007. As an increasing share of lending is 
allocated to non-productive activities such as 
household consumption or real estate, financial 
sector stability comes under pressure, requiring 
an adequate regulation and supervision. 
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The prudential indicators of the banking systems 
showed positive developments.  The average 
capital adequacy ratio stood at around 18% in the 
region at the end of 2007, well above the 12% 
threshold.  However, ratios are coming down 
relatively fast due to the banks’ rising lending 
activities.  Croatia shows the lowest capital 
adequacy ratio at the end of 2007, but the level is 
not yet a reason for concern and it increased 
from 2006 as the banks put aside additional 
capital reserves, following the stricter risk-
weighted regulations issued by the central bank. 
 


















Differences in the ratios of non-performing loans 
to total loans are more substantial.  The ratio 
appears to be declining in most economies in 
2007, except for Albania. This is to a large extent 
the result of the strong increase in the stock of 
loans, which may point to higher risks in the 
future.  Currently, the level is relatively high 
only in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.  The average profitability of the 
banking systems measured by the return-on-
equity ratio increased in general from 2003 to 
2007 and reached comfortable levels in all 
economies.  
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5.2.3.     Economic growth and its drivers 
The economies recorded moderate to strong 
growth over 2003 to 2007, driven by both strong 
investment and private consumption.  The most 
dynamic economy was Serbia which grew by 
6.1% on average during the past five years.  It 
was closely followed by Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Croatia.  The 
Montenegrin economy accelerated very much in 
2006 and 2007, against the backdrop of the 
foreign investment boom. The slowest 
economies were Kosovo and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but like in the 
entire region their economies also picked up in 
the past two years. Growth is driven by a strong 
increase in private consumption in all economies 
but investment is also picking up steadily in most 
of them.  The growth of labour productivity was 
more uneven during 2003-2007.  A strong 
advance, in excess of real GDP growth, was 
recorded in Serbia, but also Albania, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina succeeded in keeping labour 
productivity more or less in line with economic 
growth. 
 
















Investment ratios are solid in most economies 
and moreover they are on an upward trend.   In 
2006, the share of investment in GDP was close 
to or above 20% in all economies.  The 
investment ratio has increased rapidly in Croatia 
and Montenegro, driven inter alia by strong 
public investment, to around 30% of GDP.  The 
current investment level in Albania is also 
growth enhancing, but is driven mainly by 
private initiative, while the level of investment in 
the Serbian economy is trailing the group  
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The euro plays a key role in the economic and 
financial architecture of the Western Balkans.   
This is reinforced by the clear prospect of EU 
integration – be it a long-term one - and the need 
to achieve in due time the nominal convergence 
required by the EMU which provide an 
important anchor for political stability, structural 
reforms and foreign investment in the region.   
The widespread use of the euro as an exchange 
rate anchor in the Western Balkan economies is a 
main driver for the other functions played by the 
euro in terms of trade invoicing, official reserves, 
financial and parallel currency.  
Five out of the seven economies are using fixed - 
de facto or formally - exchange rate 
arrangements, which range from official 
unilateral euroisation to the use of the euro as a 
de facto peg. Moreover, the use of the euro as 
parallel cash or financial currency is extensive in 
all seven economies, also reflecting a strong 
process of financial integration between the 
region and the euro area. In 2007, close to 75% 
of the stock of domestic credit was either 
denominated or indexed in euro, also considering 
Kosovo and Montenegro where the banking 
systems are quasi-euroised.  The share of bank 
deposits denominated in euro is lower at around 
60% of the total, but remains relatively 
important.  Obtaining reliable data about the use 
of the euro as parallel cash is not straightforward, 
but it is estimated that the substitution rates range 
from about 20% to more than 50% in the region.  
Mainly due to geographic proximity and 
traditional economic linkages, which are in turn 
based on large relative comparative advantages, 
the European Union and in particular the euro 
area represents the most important trading 
partner of the Western Balkans.  Moreover, the 
share of trade invoiced in euro is even higher 
than what trade shares with the euro area would 
suggest, as revealed by the limited data available.  
The euro (initially the use of the DM as external 
anchor) has served the Western Balkan 
economies well.  Both its official use as 
exchange rate anchor or reserve currency and its 
unofficial use as a store of value or financial 
currency by the private sector helped the 
economies restore and preserve macroeconomic 
stability after the turmoil of the break-up of ex-
Yugoslavia.  Later, when the transition to market 
economies accelerated the euro anchor became a 
catalyst for remonetisation of the economies, 
rebuilding of domestic savings and deeper 
financial and trade integration with the European 
Union. Despite the more complex macro-
economic environment resulting from the heavy 
use of the euro for domestic lending or as 
parallel cash, it represents a natural development 
for economies which are preparing for EU 
accession and participation in the EMU.  The 
euro as an external anchor, together with 
complementary stabilisation policies and the 
acceleration of structural reforms led in general 
to increased inflows of FDI and robust economic 
growth.  
Nonetheless, the financial integration with the 
euro area and the use of external savings is not 
entirely free from macroeconomic and financial 
risks that could jeopardize the rapid catching-up 
process.  External imbalances are large, thus 
raising concerns about the degree to which 
external competitiveness has been maintained.   
They are driven by significant capital inflows in 
the region, which partially reflect higher 
investment returns and take the form of FDI.  Net 
FDI has been increasing as a share of GDP in the 
past five years and on average stood at around 
7% of GDP, roughly covering about 60% of the 
average current account deficits.  At the same 
time, the rising productivity and incomes 
triggered a consumption smoothing process 
based on booming credit growth, which 
accounted for the rest of the external imbalances.  
The lion's share of domestic lending occurs in 
foreign currency and is increasingly directed to 
households, which may engender systemic 
problems if the banks are not able to channel this 
resources primarily into productive activities or 
are not adequately regulated and supervised.  
The recent volatility of international financial 
markets has not had a heavy toll on the Western 
Balkan economies so far. Like in the rest of the 
world, the stock exchanges recorded serious 
declines, differing from country to country and 
the growth of the money supply decelerated in 
most of the economies. On the other hand, the 
growth of credit continued to accelerate in some 
countries, while the slowdown in the other ones 
appears to be in line with the policy intentions of 




economy is not visible yet, but it should not be 
excluded if growth in more advanced economies, 
in particular from the EU, would substantially 
slow in 2008 and 2009. An indirect transmission 
channel could be the inflows of FDI which may 
slow down due to, inter alia, a reduced 
availability of credit on the international capital 
markets and more pessimistic economic 
prospects. In that case, both the real economy 
and external vulnerability of the Western 
Balkans could be affected. 
It thus becomes clear that in order to make the 
best use of the euro anchor and their European 
perspective and at the same time be prepared to 
deal with the fallout from the international 
financial turmoil, the Western Balkan economies 
cannot be complacent about the need for 
continued stability-oriented public policies.   
A responsible fiscal policy should continue to be 
the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy and 
structural reforms that ensure flexible markets 
and productivity gains need to be accelerated, in 
order to ensure the smooth adjustment of relative 
prices.  Creating and preserving an attractive 
business environment remains the best insurance 
that the volatility of financial flows is minimised 
and the impact of endogenous or exogenous 
shocks is contained. The broader EU anchor can 
help in this respect and the countries are 
gradually implementing the aforementioned 
stabilisation and structural reforms by adopting 
the sound economic policies required by the 
EMU framework and the fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen criteria, including the acquis 
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The need for fiscal consolidation is often seen as 
a mantra of economic and fiscal policy 
prescriptions from third parties, notably the IMF. 
It is however not as such an economic policy 
objective, but rather a process aiming at 
establishing the desirable fiscal space. In the 
narrow sense, fiscal space can be defined as "the 
room in a government's budget that allows it to 
provide resources for a desired purpose without 
jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial 
position or the stability of the economy" (
1). In 
the broader sense, fiscal space further aims at 
ensuring appropriate room for the private sector's 
development, which requires that local savings 
and capital inflows are not diverted to mainly 
finance the government sector. Moreover, in 
countries with a limited margin for full fledged 
autonomous monetary policies – i.e. the vast 
majority of small and medium-size economies – 
the budget is often, within the macroeconomic 
policy mix, the core policy tool of adjustment, 
and fiscal adjustment is therefore crucial to attain 
key macroeconomic adjustment objectives. 
Thus, there is in a majority of countries – even 
though to a different extent – a high expectation 
on fiscal consolidation to deliver either (i) 
macro-economic adjustment, (ii) economic 
development and growth, (iii) more specific 
fiscal policy objectives such as limitations of 
general government spending or public debt, or 
usually a combination of those three objectives. 
This requires increasingly informed policy 
planning and well organised coordination within 
the government. The process is subject to ex-ante 
and ex-post fiscal surveillance from external 
stakeholders, including, in the broader sense, the 
financial markets. Economic and fiscal 
fundamentals, but also the extent to which this – 
implicit or explicit – process of fiscal 
surveillance is carried out in an orderly way do 
matter a lot, and influence the markets' 
assessment and behaviour, with eventual costs or 
benefits in terms of interest rates and price to pay 
for fiscal imbalances.  
Within the European Union the co-ordination 
and surveillance of economic policies –notably 
 
(
1)  Heller, Peter S. 2005. “Understanding Fiscal Space”. 
IMF Policy Discussion Paper. 
fiscal policies – aim at ensuring that Member 
States regard their economic policies as a matter 
of common concern and conduct these policies 
with a view to contributing to the objectives of 
the Community, notably sustainable and non-
inflationary growth, a high level of employment 
and social protection, convergence of economic 
performance and economic and social cohesion.  
The EU multilateral surveillance process, in 
which all member states take part, has become a 
major element for macro-economic policy 
making and co-ordination within the Union.  
The objectives behind the EU economic policy 
co-ordination are also, mutatis mutandis, valid 
for third countries.  The present paper examines 
various channels through which the EU has 
become an increasingly active stakeholder in the 
broader fiscal surveillance arena, encouraging 
fiscal consolidation, notably with the aim of 
diffusing stabilisation and economic growth to a 
cluster of countries geographically close to the 
EU, i.e. candidate and potential candidates 
countries, as well as potentially some of the 
benefits of macro-economic and fiscal policy 
planning and surveillance achieved within the 
Union. The paper further assesses main 
achievements as regards fiscal consolidation in 
this cluster of countries and recent improvements 
as regards public sector governance.  
While it would be hazardous to draw a direct link 
between surveillance and EU accession 
objectives on one side and, on the other side, 
fiscal consolidation achievements, the paper 
concludes that the combined prospect of EU 
membership and narrow margins of manoeuvre 
as regards the macro-economic policy mix 
apparently had a strong incentive role in 
convincing candidate and potential candidate 
countries' fiscal authorities to adopt overall 
prudent fiscal policies. Sustained growth allowed 
for increased fiscal revenue and reduced deficits, 
which were more easily financed owing to 
numerous privatisation operations. The challenge 
for the near future will be in a number of 
countries to adjust the pattern of fiscal 
consolidation by limiting the size of government, 
thereby further opening fiscal space for a more 




This section describes the instruments under the 
EU's existing fiscal surveillance and policy 
dialogue framework for candidate countries and 
potential candidate countries, i.e. the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. 
2.1. PRE-ACCESSION  ECONOMIC 
PROGRAMMES (PEPS) AND FISCAL 
NOTIFICATIONS BY CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES 
Currently, there are three recognised candidate 
countries: Croatia, Turkey, and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM). 
Negotiations with the former two were opened 
on 3 October 2005. While the European Council 
has in December 2005 recognised the FYRoM as 
a candidate, the opening of negotiations has been 
delayed sine die, pending improvements of the 
country in complying with the Copenhagen 
accession criteria. As theses countries approach 
accession, they need to prepare for participation 
in the multilateral surveillance and economic 
policy co-ordination procedures currently in 
place as part of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU).  
Sound budgetary policies and fiscal 
sustainability are of importance to all countries, 
but of particular relevance to countries with a 
perspective of EU membership in the  medium- 
to long-term and which therefore prepare 
themselves to meet EU Member States 
obligations under the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. To this end, a pre-accession fiscal 
surveillance has in recent years been put in place 
with candidate countries, which to a large extent 
mirrors the procedures used under the preventive 
arm of EU budgetary surveillance.  Based on an 
annual fiscal notification and the submission of a 
Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), the 
pre-accession fiscal surveillance constitutes an 
equivalent to Member States’ bi-annual fiscal 
notification and their submission of convergence 
or stability programmes.   
These instruments provide candidate countries 
with the opportunity to gradually adapt their 
fiscal policy framework to EU standards, provide 
support in preparation for EU membership, and 
facilitate peer reviews and policy 
recommendations.  This co-operation has been 
mutually beneficial in preparing previous 
accessions, although the pre-accession fiscal 
surveillance in a number of cases has not been 
able to prevent the activation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact’s corrective arm after EU accession. 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEP) 
In view of EMU rules, one of the economic 
priorities already at the time of the previous 
enlargement wave was to bring in line within the 
candidate countries the reporting, monitoring and 
control of public finances, and specifically fiscal 
positions, with current EU procedures. In 2001, 
the Commission services initiated jointly with 
the candidate countries a new initiative, called 
the "pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedure". 
It follows closely, but in a simplified manner, the 
permanent fiscal surveillance procedures for 
member states. Under this procedure, candidate 
countries have to prepare Pre-Accession 
Economic Programmes, with the objective to 
outline an appropriate medium-term policy 
framework, including public finance objectives 
and structural reform priorities needed for EU 
accession. These programmes offer an 
opportunity to develop the institutional and 
analytical capacity necessary to participate in 
EMU, particularly in the areas of multilateral 
surveillance and coordination of economic and 
fiscal policies. 
The procedure envisages an important 
multilateral dimension, including an opportunity 
for Member States and candidate countries to 
discuss the economic programmes. The 
candidate countries are invited to participate in a 
multilateral meeting with high-level officials 
from various ministries of finance. At this 
meeting, the Commission services present their 
evaluation of the respective economic 
programmes. Moreover the candidate countries 
may provide a written submission to the meeting, 
which can include inter alia an update on recent 
developments and a response to the 
Commission's preliminary evaluation.  The 
Commission also submits to the ECOFIN European Commission 
Occassional Paper 
Council its assessment of the Pre-accession 
Economic programmes and the conclusions of 
the multilateral meeting. Finally, these findings 
are made public. (
1)  
Accession to the EU does not require candidate 
countries to fulfil the Maastricht nominal 
convergence criteria, but to comply with the 
Copenhagen accession criteria  (
2) . In the pre-
accession period, the primary concern is 
medium-term fiscal sustainability, rather than 
achieving any particular fiscal target. Therefore, 
the assessment of the deficit in terms of GDP is 
likely to be a function of the speed of structural 
reforms, the relative speed of economic growth, 
the extent of real convergence as well as the 
saving-investment balance of that country. 
Fiscal Notifications 
The smooth and effective functioning of 
Economic and Monetary Union requires a co-
ordinated, multilateral surveillance approach to 
fiscal policy. This, in turn, requires a 
sophisticated information system for budgetary 
operations, relying on clear and commonly 
defined accounting standards, and good 
administrative and analytical capacity. Every six 
months, each Member State is required to 
prepare and submit to the Commission data on 
government debt, fiscal deficit levels and related 
data according to the ESA 95 accounting 
standard. 
 
                                                          
Since 2001, the candidate countries have been 
requested to make an annual notification along 
the same lines, with the aim of preparing them 
for accession. The format of this notification is 
basically identical to that currently undertaken by 
Member States, although the frequency is annual 
(instead of semi-annual for Member States). The 
                                                            
(




2)  The Copenhagen criteria require that for membership, a 
"candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and, protection of minorities, the 
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union." 
exercise of pre-accession notification together 
with its evaluation serves several objectives. 
First, it ensures that each candidate country will 
be capable of complying with the ESA 95 
national accounting standard by the date of 
accession. Second, the notification data, provided 
during the pre-accession period allow effective 
economic analysis of the current budgetary 
positions of the candidate countries. Third, the 
reporting and calculation of fiscal positions 
within the candidate countries progressively 
becomes comparable to those of EU Member 
States. 
The Commission's Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs and Eurostat 
produce an assessment of these fiscal 
notifications which is published.  (
3)   This 
assessment examines the quality and reliability 
of the notified deficit (or surplus) and debt 
figures, and of the degree of compliance of 
notified data with ESA 95 accounting 
requirements. There is widespread recognition 
that ESA95 is a complex and demanding 
statistical standard, which can under normal 
circumstances only progressively be met. 
2.2.  ECONOMIC AND FISCAL 
PROGRAMMES (EFPS) OF POTENTIAL 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
A procedure similar to the PEP one was 
established in 2006 with potential candidate 
countries from the Western Balkans (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Serbia), even though slightly lighter than in the 
case of candidate countries (notably without 
ministerial multilateral review) (
4).  Accordingly, 
each of these countries prepared and submitted 






4)  Kosovo has not yet been required to submit such a 
programme. However, donors, including the EU, 
requested Kosovo to produce annually a Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which to a large extent 
serves the same fiscal surveillance purpose.  Given the 
vulnerable situation of Kosovo's public accounts, the 
draft UN special envoy's settlement package suggested 
the establishment of a fiscal surveillance mechanism 
between the authorities and the Commission, in 
cooperation with the IMF, to ensure that Kosovo's public 
accounts remain on a sustainable track. 
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Economic and Fiscal Programme. As in the case 
of PEPs, the Commission assessment of EFPs is 
published. (
1)  
2.3.  ECONOMIC DIALOGUES WITH 
CANDIDATE AND POTENTIAL 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
Regular dialogues take place at technical level on 
macroeconomic and financial sector issues with a 
number of countries, in particular with the 
candidate countries and the potential candidate 
countries of the Western Balkan. These 
dialogues normally take place within specialised 
sub-committees created under the bilateral 
agreements concluded with these countries 
(association, partnership and cooperation, or 
trade and cooperation agreements). In the case of 
Turkey, an Enhanced Economic Dialogue has 
been established as an additional channel of 
communication.   
While these dialogues can and do address a wide 
range of issues (real economic developments, 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and developments, 
structural reforms), fiscal issues figure 
prominently given the crucial role of fiscal 
instruments in the macro-economic policy mix in 
many of the partner countries that are confronted 
with limited discretion as regards monetary 
policy. An institutional element also influences 
the emphasis on fiscal issues, namely the 
prominent role of counterparts from ministries of 
finance in these dialogues. As a result, regular 
discussions take place with these various 
countries on recent fiscal developments, the 
outlook, and the main public finance 
management and tax reforms. 
Recently the Commission has increasingly linked 
the substance of discussions in the dialogues 
with that of the PEPs and EFPs: the dialogues 
provide a useful opportunity to discuss bilaterally 
with these countries their economic and fiscal 
programmes. This bilateral format complements 
the multilateral policy dialogue which takes 
place once a year. 
 
                                                           
(
1)  Also as the precedent ones in the series "Occasional 
Papers":http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publication
s/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers32_en.htm 
2.4.  MACRO-FINANCIAL AND OTHER FORMS 
OF ASSISTANCE  
Macro-financial assistance (MFA) is a policy-
based financial instrument of untied and 
undesignated support to partner third countries. 
Macro-financial assistance is exceptional in 
nature and is mobilized on a case-by-case basis 
with a view to helping the beneficiary countries 
to deal with serious, but generally short-term, 
balance-of-payments or budget difficulties. It 
takes the form of medium- to long-term loans or 
grants (or an appropriate combination of the 
latter two) and generally complements financing 
provided in the context of an IMF programme. 
As a rule, the funds are paid to the Central Bank 
of the beneficiary country, but their final 
destination (build up of reserves, foreign 
exchange market interventions or direct support 
to the budget) is generally left to be decided by 
the authorities in agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund. Grant components 
of this form of assistance, if any, are normally 
channelled to the recipient country's budget. 
Macro-financial assistance is combined with 
other EU assistance programmes in order to 
create synergies and to facilitate the 
implementation of structural reform measures. 
Disbursements are subject to conditionality. A 
significant share of conditions is in most cases 
related to public finance management and 
reform.  Commission staff missions have 
regularly reviewed the economic and fiscal 
situation and the state of play as regards the 
implementation of the recipient authorities' 
policy undertakings. Thereby, while MFA has 
not primarily been a budget support instrument 
(with a few exceptions), it has contributed to 
budget consolidation in the broader sense. 
Recently, macro-financial assistance has been 
mainly provided to the Western Balkans (63.5% 
of the operations decided from 1999 to 2002 and 
72% for 2000-2007) and some low income NIS 
countries. Currently, there remains one active 
MFA operation, in favour of Kosovo, approved 
by the Council in November 2006. 











Albania n.a. Ba1/Baa1/Stable n.a. 6
Bosnia and Herzegovina n.a. B2/Ba3/Stable n.a. 7
Montenegro BB+/Negative/B Ba2/n.a./Stable n.a. 6
Serbia BB-/Negative/B n.a. BB- 7
Kosovo (UN 1244) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Croatia BBB+/Stable/A-2 A1/Baa1/Stable BBB- 4
fYroM BBB-/Stable/A-3 n.a. BB+ 5
Turkey BB/Negative/B BA1/Ba3/Stable BB- 4
(1) Soverign local currency ratings (long term / outlook / short term).
(2) Government's foreign currency / local currency / outlook, bond ratings.
(3) Long-term local currency rating (LTFC) rating.
(4) The Country Risk Classification Method measures the country credit risk, i.e. the likelihood that a country will
service its external debt by assessing country credit risk and classifying countries into eight country risk categories (0
best - 7 worst).
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2.5. FISCAL SURVEILLANCE BY OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS  
Fiscal consolidation has been an explicit aim of 
governments of Western Balkan countries and 
Turkey which, at the turn of the millennium, 
were in most cases faced with weak fiscal 
positions and medium to high public debt 
burdens. These domestic policies have been 
reinforced by cooperation and agreements 
reached with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), substantially contributing to macro-
economic stabilisation and notably balance-of-
payments and fiscal consolidation over the 
period (see below section 2.1 on fiscal 
consolidation outcomes). 
In view of an improved macro-economic 
situation and outlook some Fund supported 
programmes, e.g. in Albania and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have put 
increased emphasis on structural reforms. 
However, recent developments in candidate and 
potential candidate countries suggest that the 
authorities, comforted with broadly successful 
stabilisation programmes and a more sustainable 
outlook of their balance of payments, have been 
less keen to engage into formal arrangements 
with the IMF, thus in a number of cases limiting 
their cooperation with the IMF to Article IV 
consultations and technical assistance. 
Serbia, comforted with substantial FDI inflows 
has even made early debt repayments to the IMF, 
thereby reducing its external indebtedness, and 
de facto limiting the Fund's say on its economic 
and fiscal policy making. It also remains 
uncertain whether Turkey, the country that is 
currently the largest IMF borrower will be 
willing to engage into a successor programme 
after the current one has come to an end in May 
2008. 
Credit rating agencies also play a permanent role 
on the fiscal surveillance scene, since part of 
their assessment and ratings are geared towards 
monitoring sovereign lending risks and possible 
defaults on public debt. 
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IMF programmes in candidate and potential candidate





EFF; 29/11/2000 – 22/11/2001
SBA; 30/4/2003 – 15/8/2004
SBA; 31/8/2005 – 30/8/2008
SBA 22/12/1999 – 20/12/2001
of which SRF 21/12/2000 – 20/12/2001
SBA 04/02/2002 – 03/02/2005
SBA 11/05/2005 – 10/05/2008
Potential candidates
Albania ESAF
(1)/PRGF 13/05/1998 – 31/07/2001
PRGF 21/06/2002 – 11/20/2005
EFF
(2) 01/02/2006 – 31/01/2009 and
PRGF
(3) 01/02/2006 – 31/01/2009
SBA May 1998 – May 2001
SBA August 2002 – February 2004
Montenegro No programme since the independence of 
Montenegro (June 2006). 
Currently no programme
SBA, June 2001-May 2002
EFF, May 2002 – Feb 2006
Kosovo
(under UNSCR 1244)
After the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kosovo entered into force on 15 June 
2008, Kosovo applied for IMF membership. 
Cooperation with the Fund was previously 
formalised through an understanding on a 
Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal 
Policies (MEFP) and a Letter of Intent 
(November 2005).
An Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies agreed in November 2005 laid out a 
fiscal framework. IMF staff and authorities 
have since then continued discussions with 
the intention to negotiate a new 
understanding. However, currently no such 
understanding is in place.
(1 ) ESAF – Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(2 ) EFF – Extended Fund Facility
(3 ) PRGF – Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Last programme expired in February 2004  
Serbia (before 2006, 
Serbia-Montenegro)
Last programme expired in February 2006.
IMF review mission to visit Tirana early 
November 2007. Following an understanding 
on required policy measures, fourth review 
under the combined PRGF and EFF was 
approved by the Board in Jan. 2008.
Croatia Last programme expired in November 2006. 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Current programme treated as pre-cautionary 
facility after the first tranche withdrawal in 
September 2005
Turkey Final review completed on 10 May 2008. Until 
further notice, Turkey is subject to Post-
Programme monitoring.  
 3.  RECENT FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COUNTRIES 
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3.1.  PATTERNS OF FISCAL TRENDS AND 
CONSOLIDATIONS 








HR fYRoM TR CC AL BiH ME SRB Kos -
UN 1244
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Fiscal positions have markedly improved in 
candidate and potential candidate countries since 
2000. In each of the three candidate countries the 
general government deficit was progressively 
reduced over the period of 2002-2006, after a 
hike in 2001 which had no clear common 
ground. This improvement remained modest in 
Croatia where the deficit reduction has been 
rather gradual and more visible towards the end 
of the period. In Turkey, fiscal consolidation was 
spectacular as the deficit was reduced from 
record levels in 2001 (20% of GDP) turning into 
a slight surplus in 2006. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, after a deterioration of 
the situation in 2001 largely due to civil unrest in 
the country, a quite drastic fiscal adjustment took 
place and the budget balance turned positive in 
2004 and has remained close to balance since 
then. Among potential candidate countries, the 
overall trend has also displayed a significant 
degree of consolidation with the general 
government balance improving from close to -
5% to a slight surplus and the most spectacular 
improvements taking place towards the end of 
the period between 2005 and 2007. However, the 
patterns of this overall favourable trend were 
quite different across countries. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina achieved a turnaround of its fiscal 
balance by almost 10 percentage points (from -
7% to +3% of GDP) between 2001 and 2006. 
This however came to an end in 2007 with a 
significant fiscal slippage. Albania achieved a 
rather steady reduction of its public deficit. The 
series are less reliable in the case of Serbia and 
Montenegro, given the biased deficit data for 
2000, but both countries ended the period with 
reduced deficits or in surplus (Montenegro). In 
the case of Serbia, however fiscal consolidation 
was partially reversed in 2006 and 2007 in light 
of several up coming elections. Kosovo, which 
under the UN mandate could not so far borrow, 
remained a particular case with episodes of 
positive fiscal outcomes leading to the 
accumulation of cash deposits, followed by 
episodes of depletion of these reserves. Overall, 
in both candidate and potential candidate 
countries, the number of favourable episodes 
(defined as annual improvements in the general 
government balance) markedly outweighed the 
negative ones. Reversals (i.e. deteriorations that 
follow improvements) were in most cases short 
lived (only one year). 
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This overall favourable trend mirrors a sharp 
reduction in primary deficits, or increase in 
primary surpluses. Both groups of countries 
(candidate and potential candidate countries) 
ended the period with an average (non-weighted) 
primary surplus. The average primary balance 
turned positive in candidate countries in 2003. It 
dramatically increased in Turkey which was able 
to comply with the 6.5% primary surplus fiscal 
rule between 2003 and 2006 that was agreed with 
the IMF in view of the country's high debt 
burden. The government has however recently 
announced a policy shift, with increased capital 
expenditure and primary surpluses expected to be 
gradually reduced down to 2.4% in 2012. In 
Croatia, the primary deficit has been falling since 
2004 and came close to zero in 2006. 
The  former  Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
exhibiting a more modest level of public debt, 
achieved a primary balance surplus in 2004, 
which was slightly reduced in the following 
years. In potential candidate countries, primary 
balances also markedly improved. In Serbia and Part II 
Fiscal consolidation in candidate and potential candidate countries. Steps towards EMU accession 
Montenegro, after an initial deterioration in 2001 
(at the time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
resumed the servicing of debt on which it had 
defaulted under the previous regime), a sharp 
improvement took place, supported by the debt 
restructuring agreement of 2001 (see below). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, faced with substantial 
contingent liabilities which may inflate public 
debt and windfall revenues following the 
introduction of VAT, achieved a surplus of 3% 
Box II.3.1: DATA DO MATTER :  
THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY IN THE CASE OF CROATIA 
The concept for reporting the fiscal deficit which is mostly used in official publications and in 
the press and therefore best known to the general public in Croatia is referred to as the deficit 
on a "modified accrual basis". It is based on GFS 1986 standards and applies partial accrual's 
accounting for some items on the spending side.  This concept was used as the main policy 
target to be observed under IMF programme implementation between 2004 and 2006. It is 
still largely referred to in domestic public discussions on fiscal policy as well as in analytical 
papers and reports issued by international institutions. 
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GFS 1986 "modified accrual" 
ESA 95 (Fiscal notification 2007)
 
At the same time, over the past years, Croatia has undertaken important steps with a view to 
aligning budget reporting with EU Accounting standards (ESA 95). In the context of the 
annual Pre-Accession Fiscal Notifications, which are part of the Pre-Accession Fiscal 
Surveillance Procedure,  the Croatian Ministry of Finance has reported fiscal deficit and debt 
figures to the European Commission on an annual basis since 2005. While the first 
submission in 2005 was still based on GFS methodology, the notifications submitted in 2006, 
2007 and 2008 were based on ESA 95, reflecting gradual progress in improving quality of 
data and meeting EU requirements. In its  assessment of the 2007 data submission , the 
European Commission acknowledged considerable progress made and pointed out that further 
efforts were needed in order to ensure full ESA 95 compliance. Remaining deficiencies were 
identified in the (still partial) application of accrual accounting, in particular with respect to 
the recording of taxes, guarantees and debt repayments to pensioners. At the same time, the 
assessment noted that the well-established use of GFS methodology in the government 
finance statistics should provide some reassurances to the overall quality of the data. 
As a matter of fact (see graph), deficits calculated according to GFS and ESA 95 
methodologies show a similar trend of a gradual deficit reduction over recent years. The size 
of the deficit is different, but the difference is relatively small in most years. Deficits as 
calculated under GFS are larger in each year as compared to the ESA 95 equivalent. Among a 
number of methodological reasons, this seems largely due to the fact that capital revenues, i.e. 
gross disposals of non-financial assets, are treated as a financing item "below the line" under 
GFS, while ESA 95 treats them as revenues "above" the line with a deficit reducing effect.   
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of GDP in 2006. However, a reversal of this 
favourable outcome took place in 2007 on the 
back of expansionary fiscal policies. Albania 
improved its primary balance position over the 
period which turned close to zero in 2006. Latest 
developments point to a number of fiscal policy 
reversals, with a looser fiscal stance in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
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The extent to which this overall improvement in 
budget balances is providing increased financing 
space for private sector driven development and 
growth varies across countries, also impacting on 
current account developments over the same 
period. In a majority of candidate and potential 
candidate countries, current account deficits 
widened sharply over the period, also mirroring 
strong capital inflows and vigorous GDP growth. 
Among these countries the only one to have 
recorded a reduction of the non-government 
savings and investment balance over the period 
is the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
where fiscal consolidation went back to back 
with an improvement in the current account 
balance. This consolidation of the current 
account however also reflects a rather modest 
growth performance of the country. In Turkey, 
following the sharp 2001 recession (-9.5% drop 
in GDP) growth resumed in 2002 and in spite of 
reduced general government deficits a widening 
of the overall (current account) and non-
government savings and investment balance was 
recorded. Elsewhere, vigorous growth over the 
period also triggered increased deficits of the 
current account and of the non-government 
savings and investment balance, except in 
Kosovo which recorded both slow growth and 
high imbalances. 
3.2. DEBT  DYNAMICS 
Public indebtedness has overall markedly 
decreased in recent years in both candidate and 
potential candidate countries. Within the group 
of candidate countries, public debt fell sharply in 
Turkey after a last hike in 2001, mirroring the 
drastic fiscal consolidation which has meanwhile 
taken place with sizeable primary balance 
surpluses. In Croatia however, the public debt 
stock steadily increased until 2005, in line with 
the lack of vigorous fiscal adjustment policies.  
In potential candidate countries, public debt 
ratios (to GDP) sharply decreased, particularly in 
Serbia and Montenegro where this was   
facilitated by the generous 2001 debt 
rescheduling of the Paris Club (reduction of debt 
by 2/3) – also followed by a debt rescheduling 
agreement with London Club creditors-  both of 
which took fully effect in 2006 upon the 
satisfactory completion of the IMF programme. 
Since 2004, improvements in the fiscal balance 
have further supported a decrease in public debt 
levels. On the back of substantial privatisation 
revenue inflows, the Serbian government has 
made in 2006 and 2007 early debt pre-payments 
to the IMF and World Bank.  In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina external public debt fell sharply as 
a share of GDP, a process supported by the 
rescheduling agreements with the Paris Club and 
London Club group of creditors in 1997/1998, 
the large extent of new borrowing on 
concessional terms, relatively strong GDP 
growth and a sizeable fiscal consolidation until 
2006. This trend was somewhat reversed in 
2007, when fiscal policy turned substantially 
more expansionary. However, a large amount of 
unsettled domestic liabilities will add to the 
current moderate public debt stock figures and 
calls for the continuation of cautious fiscal 
policies.  Albania also saw a decrease of its 
public debt ratio over the period, even though a 
less dramatic one, supported by steady decreases 
in its fiscal deficit. 
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3.3.    THE COMPONENTS OF RECENT FISCAL 
ADJUSTMENT  
The size of the public sector, measured as 
general government spending relative to GDP, 
varies significantly across candidate countries 
and potential candidate countries. The three 
candidate countries achieved some downsizing in 
government spending (in GDP percentage terms) 
over the past few years. Among candidate 
countries, Croatia remains the one with the 
highest share of general government spending, 
amounting to 47.8% of GDP in 2006 (compared 
to 51.5% of GDP in 2001). In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey the 
size of the public sector is relatively modest 
(around 34% and 30% of GDP respectively).  
In potential candidate countries, the situation is 
uneven. In Albania a modest and rather stable 
size of general government (around 28% of 
GDP) may have been conducive to the relatively 
dynamic private-sector led growth of the country 
over recent years. 
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Kosovo also has an overall low level of general 
government expenditures (28.1% of GDP in 
2006) but the size of the civil service in terms of 
its share of total government expenditure is large 
(12% of GDP). Downsizing the relative weight 
of current expenditure would be required to 
make room for a larger share of capital 
expenditure financed from the budget. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, public spending declined from 
the beginning of the decade, largely driven by 
the reduction of foreign financed investment 
projects. The trend was however reversed in 
2007 and government spending reached 50% of 
GDP, a level which calls for significant 
downsizing. In Montenegro and Serbia the 
relative size of general government expenditure 
is somewhat lower (2006: 42.6% and 42.5% of 
GDP respectively).  
Fiscal adjustment in candidate and potential 
candidate countries has over the period been 
mainly achieved through revenue increases 
rather than expenditure reductions. To a large 
extent, the increase in revenues was driven by 
the overall buoyant economic activity in the 
context of benign external conditions. Therefore, 
it is less clear how meaningful the consolidation 
in cyclically-adjusted terms would be. As for 
candidate countries, there is a quite different 
pattern of the fiscal adjustment during 2000-
2007. The sizeable fiscal adjustment in Turkey 
was based on both lower interest payments and 
revenue improvements. In Croatia a 2.8 
percentage points of GDP improvement of the 
budgetary balance was mainly achieved with 
higher revenues, a feature which is not the 
desirable one in view of the already substantial 
size of government. For the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the mild deterioration of 
the fiscal balance (2.4 percentage points of GDP 
in 2000-2006) was caused by some decrease in 
government revenues and a mild increase of 
current and capital expenditures at the same time. 
Among potential candidate countries, BiH 
pursued a significant fiscal adjustment, mainly 
based on a reduction of expenditures, which was 
however reversed in 2007. Albania's fiscal 
adjustment resulted from a decrease in interest 
payments and from higher revenues. The other 
potential candidates increased their government 
revenues markedly in the period from 2000 to 
2006 and, to a lesser extent, government 
expenditure. 
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Fiscal adjustment in the candidate and potential 
candidates has thus mainly been based on 
increases in revenues. Tax policies pursued and 
changes introduced, including in tax 
management, contributed to this overall increase. 
The situation is however uneven across 
countries. In Turkey and former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia the levels of government 
revenues are relatively low. Turkey is 
characterised by low tax compliance (partly 
reflecting weak enforcement), but good progress 
has over the period been made in the area of tax 
administration. A still ongoing personal income 
tax reform as well as new legislation on 
corporate income tax aim at simplifying taxation, 
primarily by decreasing the number of rates and 
expanding the tax base. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the fairly good fiscal 
performance was achieved in spite of a reduction 
in government revenue, thus maintaining a light 
government burden. Efforts in improving the 
efficiency of administration and simplifying the 
tax system continued. Lately the country's 
authorities have embarked on an ambitious tax 
reduction programme, while keeping expenditure 
levels constant. In order to stimulate investment 
and economic growth a flat rate on personal and 
corporate income was introduced in January 
2007. The rates for these two taxes were reduced 
to 12% and a further decrease to 10% is 
envisaged for 2008.  
In the case of Croatia, the benign revenue 
performance over the recent period was largely 
driven by cyclical factors rather than by systemic 
changes in the tax system and, as expected in a 
country with relatively large public spending, the 
tax burden is heavy with a share of total revenues 
to GDP of around 40%. Revenue generation 
relies heavily on the taxation of consumption and 
labour, the latter driven by relatively high social 
security contributions. VAT remained an 
important revenue source, currently representing 
60% of total tax revenues, complemented by 
significant excise duties (20% of total tax 
revenues). The Croatian tax regime has remained 
broadly unchanged over recent years with the 
exception of a significant overhaul of corporate 
income taxation and changes to personal income 
taxation , as well as some limited amendments to 
VAT , which are unlikely to have major effects 
on the size and composition of revenues.  
As for the potential candidate countries, Albania 
is moving from a relatively sophisticated tax 
system towards a more simplified one with a 
broadened tax base and the tax administration 
becoming more effective .  I n  B o s n i a  a n d  
Herzegovina, the function of indirect taxation 
was transferred to the state level under the 
auspices of the Indirect Tax Authority and a 
unified customs law and value added tax rate of 
17% have been implemented recently. Direct 
taxation in that country is determined at entity 
level and is undergoing important changes. In 
Montenegro, the authorities' policy aims at 
decreasing some distorting taxes. The Serbian 
authorities further aim at widening the tax base 
and recently introduced changes in the tax 
system, mainly lowering the tax burden on 
labour and improving tax administration by 
reducing tax evasion. A significant degree of 
fiscal consolidation has been achieved in Kosovo 
by raising tax revenues, mainly from indirect 
taxes (VAT, excise, customs) collected at the 
border, which represent roughly three quarters of 
overall tax revenue. 
Overall, it is clear (notably from graph I.3.6 
above) that the pattern of fiscal consolidation has 
been significantly different in candidate and 
potential candidate countries, with the first 
achieving fiscal consolidation both from 
increased revenue and –even more- reduced 
expenditure and the latter having based their 
improved budget outcomes on buoyant revenue, 
while both current and capital expenditure 
increased. The extent however to which the 
improvements are structural cannot be fully 
assessed in the absence of estimates of cyclical 
components –which play a lesser role in catching 
up economies than in the EU member states - 
and output gaps. Future research would further 
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also need to fully clarify the extent to which 
credit-financed booms in consumption as well as 
in the construction sector –as opposed to one of 
the other main sources of financing, remittances 
which rather feed into the informal economy-   
have led to GDP growth being "tax-rich"
(1), a 




1) The Commission's report "EMU@10: successes and 
challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary 
Union" has identified a similar temporary increase in 
implicit tax elasticities during housing booms or the 
catching-up phase of several countries converging 
towards the euro, which may mislead policy makers into 
believing that available resources are permanent. 4.  DEVELOPMENT OF FISCAL GOVERNANCE AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRIES 
 
42 
4.1.  ADOPTION OF FISCAL RULES 
Fiscal rules can contribute to fiscal consolidation 
and macro-economic adjustment, by committing 
the authorities to a target and signalling to the 
wide public, in particular financial markets, that 
a benchmark exists on which to assess the 
authorities' compliance with their own 
programme, thereby improving the government's 
accountability on its commitments. They may be 
a powerful instrument to influence the economic 
agents' expectations, in particular as regards 
price developments and interest rates. Following 
elections, a fiscal rule adopted under an outgoing 
government may be difficult to challenge or to 
call off.  
Throughout the long process of pre-accession, 
the EU's EMU fiscal rules influence the 
candidate and potential candidate countries' 
policy setting. However, even in the case of 
candidate countries, the EU is not requesting 
compliance with EMU fiscal rules before 
accession. Moreover, at an early stage of 
transition these rules may not always be tailored 
to the economic and fiscal situation of the 
relevant countries. While the adoption of 
appropriate fiscal rules ultimately lies with the 
authorities of each country, the IMF has in a 
number of cases insisted on their very strong 
signalling effect having the potential to 
lend/increase credibility to the authorities' 
undertakings.  
Among candidate countries, a fiscal rule was 
adopted in Turkey: the government targeted, as 
of 2002 and in agreement with the IMF, a 6.5% 
of GNP primary surplus of the general 
government sector. Until 2006, this rule has 
successfully contributed to fiscal adjustment and 
supported the dis-inflation process. In 2007, a 
year of elections, the rule was not met. As from 
2008, a new medium-term fiscal framework will 
be in place, whereby the primary surplus will be 
gradually reduced from 3.5% of GDP in 2008 to 
2.4% in 2012. 
Kosovo under the UNMIK authority has not had 
recourse to public borrowing, which has implied 
stringent constraints, i.e. that a budget deficit can 
only occur if available donor support or cash 
surpluses from previous years can finance it. A 
de facto current expenditure rule was also 
introduced in Kosovo as part of the Letter of 
Intent agreed with IMF staff in November 2005, 
in spite of Kosovo under UN status not being an 
IMF member, and the Letter of Intent having less 
a formal nature than a full fledged programme. 
According to this rule, real expenditures must not 
grow more than 0.5% per year. The rule was 
effectively implemented in the 2006 and 2007 
budgets. Its role was further enforced by the 
obligation to decrease the number of persons on 
the government's payroll by a pre-specified 
amount. A comparable rule is expected to be 
maintained in the context of a new understanding 
to be reached with the IMF, currently being 
discussed. 
Limitations to local government borrowing have 
been established over the period in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, following the 
enactment of a law on local government finance 
and in Serbia where local government borrowing 
was restricted to the capital investment part of 
local governments' budgets. 
4.2.  IMPROVING PUBLIC FINANCE 
MANAGEMENT 
Budget formulation and execution.  
Public accounting systems have in most 
countries progressively been enhanced over 
recent years, with the introduction of 
international standards. In most cases, candidate 
and potential candidate countries first introduced 
GFS standards, often influenced by close IMF 
fiscal surveillance in the context of Fund 
supported programmes. Fiscal data are however 
not yet everywhere fully compliant with GFS 
2001 standards. As regards candidate countries, 
the EU perspective already leads to the 
progressive adoption of ESA 95 standards: 
among the three current candidates, Croatia was 
the first one, in 2006, to publish government data 
according to ESA 95 standards. The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was still at this Part II 
Fiscal consolidation in candidate and potential candidate countries. Steps towards EMU accession 
stage upgrading its government accounting to 
GFS 2001 standards, which are also those used 
by Turkey for its budget. 
Multi-annual budgeting is a key policy and 
planning instrument enabling the explicit 
prioritisation of policy actions within the overall 
budget constraint. It facilitates and clarifies 
choices, as well as annual budget programming, 
and may facilitate the adoption of a policy 
response to sustainability challenges. The 
establishment of PEPs and EFPs (as indicated 
above) at the request of the Commission is 
another reason for the introduction of 
multiannual budgeting in a number of these 
countries.  
The three candidate countries have already put in 
place medium-term (mainly three-year) 
economic and fiscal frameworks. Turkey in 
particular, which has a central planning 
institution –the State Planning Organisation-, has 
well established planning tools, and the three-
year fiscal programme as well as annual budgets 
are prepared on the basis of medium term 
projections and a medium term financial plan. 
This three-year framework is completed by a 
five-year Development Plan. Turkey and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also 
had three-year IMF Stand-By Arrangements in 
place, which have ended in Turkey in May 2008 
and are about to come to an end soon in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
 
In potential candidate countries, multiannual 
planning has also been supported by recent IMF 
programmes. Albania is currently in the last year 
of an IMF supported multiannual  PRGF 
programme. Serbia, after the IMF board 
conclusion in February 2006 of a multi-annual 
EFF programme, continued to adopt annually a 
"budget memorandum" with a three-year fiscal 
policy framework. In 2006, the four potential 
candidate countries prepared for the first time a 
three-year EFP. In the case of Kosovo, it has 
been considered essential in liaison with the 
main donors for the Kosovan authorities to adopt 
annually a Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) that consolidates budget and 
off-budget public expenditure and revenue and is 
a useful planning tool facilitating the 
identification of expected financing needs: the 
first MTEF was adopted in March 2006 and has 
been followed by a second one in September 
2007 for the period 2008-2010, and more 
recently a third one in June 2007 covering the 
period 2008-2011.  
 
Single Treasury Accounts. 
The centralisation of government financial 
transactions in a single account in the ministry of 
finance is a pre-requisite for orderly cash and 
debt management, and thus often one of the first 
measures to be introduced in transition 
economies. Among candidate and potential 
candidate countries, the latest one to establish a 
single treasury was Montenegro (2002). In 1999, 
UNMIK had created a treasury single account in 
Kosovo, albeit with a number of sub-accounts.  
However, a number of extra-budgetary funds 
often remain, typically for the holding and 
management of health, pensions and social 
contributions and payments, and in a number 
countries for investments in specific areas (e.g. 
road investment fund in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, defence industry 
investment fund in Turkey), or to hold 
privatisation receipts (e.g. Kosovo where they 
are held on Trust funds). Other numerous off-
budget accounts continue to exist in a more 
limited number of countries (notably the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,) a situation 
which not only reduces the transparency and 
accountability of public accounts and limits 
possible gains from optimised cash and debt 
management, but which may also increase the 
risk of outright cash mismanagement and waste. 
Public finance internal control and audit. 
  Increasing emphasis is being put on internal 
control and audit in public administrations 
throughout the world, as a key element of 
enhanced public financial management, and this 
also applies to the cluster of countries under 
consideration. Recently, some concrete steps 
towards the establishment and efficient 
implementation of public finance internal 
controls and audit have taken place in candidate 
countries. As regards external control, the degree 
of development of the state audit institutions and 
systems varies across the countries. For example, 
while in Croatia the State Audit Office and the 




external audit in general meet the requirements 
of the International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) auditing standards 
for effective and efficient audit of public finance 
and resources, in former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia the coresponding functions are still in 
the process of being established and need further 
institutional strengthening. In potential candidate 
countries the situation is at an even earlier stage 
of development as regards both internal and 
external audit and controls.  
4.3.  NON-INFLATIONARY FINANCING OF 
PUBLIC DEBT 
Limitations to monetary financing of public debt 
are a crucial element of sound fiscal policies. In 
the countries of former Yugoslavia in particular, 
the legacy of public deficits monetisation and 
subsequent hyperinflation in the 1990's raised 
public awareness on the flaws of lenient policies 
in this respect and has facilitated the 
establishment of a sounder environment in the 
newly independent republics.  Lessons from 
previous painful crisis have also been learnt in 
Turkey, where legal changes introduced in 2001 
prohibit central bank financing of the 
government. As a matter of fact, national 
legislation on central banks in both candidates 
and potential candidate countries is to a 
significant extent aligned with the EU Treaty's 
provisions prohibiting the central bank to finance 
public debt. In all three candidate countries, laws 
regulating central bank activities forbid lending 
to different bodies and levels of government, or 
as in Croatia also to the public sector. This is 
also the case in potential candidate countries, 
except in Albania, where the central bank is 
allowed to provide short-term loans to the 
government. Under the present currency regime -
with the euro as legal tender- the Central Bank of 
Kosovo is not an issuing monetary authority and 
cannot provide any credit facility.  5. CONCLUSIONS 
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While it would be hazardous to draw a direct link 
between surveillance and EU accession 
objectives on one side and, on the other side, 
fiscal consolidation achievements, the combined 
prospect of EU membership and narrow margins 
of manoeuvre as regards the macro-economic 
policy mix appears to have had a strong incentive 
role for candidate and potential candidate 
countries' fiscal authorities to adopt overall 
prudent fiscal policies.  
Sustained growth allowed for increased fiscal 
revenue and reduced deficits, which were more 
easily financed owing to numerous privatisation 
operations. In candidate countries –contrary to 
developments in potential candidates- 
improvements in fiscal balances were also 
achieved through a limitation of government 
spending. In the absence of estimates of output 
gaps and structural balances it remains however 
difficult to fully assess the extent to which these 
improvements were purely cyclical or also of a 
structural nature.  
For South-East European countries, the challenge 
for the near future will be to adjust the pattern of 
fiscal consolidation by limiting the size of 
government, thereby further opening fiscal space 
for a more sustained private sector development. 
Over the medium-term, further challenges will 
remain in particular in light of large expected 
liabilities, stemming partially from property 
restitution in several countries, contingent 
liabilities, and demographic developments with a 
rapid ageing of societies except in Turkey, 
Albania and Kosovo which have a young 
population. In addition, growing macro-
economic imbalances and external and financial 
vulnerabilities in several countries will require a 
more restrictive policy response.  
While monetary policy would normally be 
expected to deliver adjustments which are 
unlikely to be attained with the announced fiscal 
policy, the lack of effective monetary 
transmission mechanisms – largely due to the 
high degree of euroisation in several cases – will 
not make it possible for monetary policy to 
adequately match fiscal policy in containing 
rising external imbalances. The onus within the 
macro-policy mix is thus expected to remain on 
fiscal policies to address these imbalances.  
On the other hand, as structural reforms are the 
most crucial driver of competitiveness over the 
medium- and long-term, improving policy 
planning will require more attention to be 
devoted by home authorities to the interaction 
between fiscal policies and structural reforms. 
The Commission can contribute to enhancing 
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